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The purpose of this thesis was to examine the major
difficulties associated with administration of food service
contracts in the Army, Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps. Speci-
fically, pre-award causes of these difficulties, actions taken
by Government contract administration officials, and reactions
of contractors to these difficulties have been identified.
Actions both Government and industry can take during pre-award
and post-award to improve the performance of food service
contracts are recommended. An informational background for
food service contracting has been developed. Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals and protests to the Comptroller
General were examined in detail; General Accounting Office
(GAO) , Army Audit Agency, and Navy Audit Service reports
relative to food service contracting were reviewed; and mail
survey results of Government officials and contractors were
presented to determine the major difficulties associated with
administration and performance of food service contracts. The
thesis describes how administration and performance difficul-
ties are caused by pre-award actions by the Government, and
how corrective actions can significantly reduce the incidence
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During the Carter Administration, the Office of Management
and Budget Circular A-7 6 was emphasized as an important
Government program for reducing spending. A-7 6 established
that the Government should not perform work in-house that
could be completed by the private sector. Any product or
service that is required by the Government should be purchased
commercially unless the Government can perform the service at
a competitive price.
This emphasis on the civilian sector has immensely
increased the use of service contractors to perform many
functions previously accomplished by Government employees.
Contracting for services from the private sector increased
during the last decade more than 30 percent. [Ref. l:p. 14]
In fact, during Fiscal Year 1990, service contracting by
Government agencies amounted to over $80 billion. [Ref. 2:p.
501] Included in these contracts is the use of civilian
contractors to provide food service support to Government
installations. The service components of the Department of
Defense have all begun to contract out for food service
support. This contract action is not designed simply to
obtain food service at a competitive price, but also to allow
military personnel to perform mission essential duties without
being tasked the additional duties as mess attendants.
Installations have had varied levels of success with food
service contracts, ranging from successful completions to
terminations due to contractor defaults.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to identify specific
post-award difficulties and pre-award causes of these
difficulties in food service contracting for the Departments
of the Army and Navy, and recommend improvements to the
procurement process. Contract administration is divided into
three distinct areas. These areas are: specific tasks to
administer a food service contract, contract types and
incentives that encourage successful contract performance, and
the level of education and training achieved by Government
technical representatives and contract administrators.
Food service contracting was chosen because it is an area
in which very little research has been done, and it is a
fairly recent service to be contracted out. However, more and
more food service contracts are awarded each year and the
results are not always acceptable.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is: What are the major
difficulties associated with the administration of food
service contracts and how might these difficulties be
resolved?
The secondary questions are:
What are the primary causes of failure or default of food
service contracts?
What difficulties in the performance of food service
contracts can be attributed to pre-award actions?
How have Government Contract Administration officials
attempted to resolve post-award problems associated with
food service contracts and what degree of success has
been achieved?
How have contractors reacted to the difficulties
associated with performing food service contracts?
What actions can both Government and industry take prior
to award that could improve the performance of food
service contracts?
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The food service contracts that will be looked at are
those associated with operating a military installation in the
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. However, in review of judicial
proceedings, Air Force food service contracts were also
researched to receive valuable input from rulings provided by
the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) and the
Comptroller General of the United States.
E . METHODOLOGY
The initial research material was collected from a
literature search conducted through the Defense Technical
Information Center, Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange, Dudley Knox Library at the Naval Postgraduate
School, discussions with contracting officers and their
technical representatives, and audit officials from the Army
and Navy. From this information, the research questions were
developed.
An analysis of all Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals (ASBCA) and Comptroller General decisions relative to
food service contracts from 1985 to present was conducted to
develop data that would help answer the research questions.
This approach was considered an appropriate way to begin to
develop a trend analysis of difficulties associated with the
administration of food service contracts and associated pre-
award causes of these post-award difficulties.
An analysis of reports conducted by the General Accounting
Office, Army Audit Agency, and Navy Audit Service pertaining
to food service contracts was also performed. This method was
considered an appropriate way of conducting research to
determine Government audit official's opinions concerning pre-
award and post-award difficulties pertaining to food service
contracts. Additionally, this analysis was conducted to
develop data on recommendations and subsequent actions
Government officials have taken to resolve pre-award and post-
award difficulties associated with food service contracts.
An informal survey questionnaire was sent to contracting
officers, and Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives
(COTR's) in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who are actively
involved with food service contracts. Additionally, a
separate survey questionnaire was sent to civilian food
service contractors. These surveys were conducted to develop
data that would help answer the research questions. This
method was considered an appropriate way to solicit and
receive data from all parties that are actively involved in
food service contracting. The researcher chose to frame the
questions so as to allow the participant to subjectively
answer questions pertinent to this research in a manner which
would provide new ideas from field activities and contractors.
The survey participants from the Government consisted of
78 Contracting Officers and COTR's in the Army, Navy and
Marine Corps. The survey participants from the civilian
contractor population consisted of 80 contractors that have
either been awarded a food service contract or have submitted
a proposal or bid in response to a Request for Proposal (RFP)
or Invitation for Bid (IFB) by the Government for a food
service contract.
The contracting officer that was responsible for food
service contract administration at the installation was asked
to participate and receive input from the COTR in providing a
response. The names of the contractors were provided by the
contracting officers for those contractors performing food
service contracts, and by use of a bidders list of a current
food service contract solicitation.
After the surveys were returned to the researcher, the
results were collated, analyzed, and conclusions and recom-
mendations were developed.
To conduct a complete analysis of the difficulties
associated with administration of food service contracts and
the pre-award causes of these difficulties this researcher
sought to obtain not only the Government officials view but
also the view of judicial bodies and that of the civilian
contractor.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The thesis consists of six chapters. This chapter is an
introduction to the thesis. The next chapter provides the
reader with general information about food service contracts
and how they are administered. Chapter III presents an
analysis of Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA)
cases and Comptroller General decisions involving food service
contracts. Chapter IV presents an analysis of audits of the
General Accounting Office, Army, and Navy pertaining to food
service contracts. The fifth chapter presents the survey
questions and the responses given by Government officials and
civilian contractors. The final chapter discusses the results
of this study, draws conclusions based upon the research data,
and makes specific recommendations resulting from this effort.
The chapter concludes with recommended areas for additional
research.
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter will provide the reader with a general
overview of food service contracting. It will cover some
basic definitions, laws, the administrative processes that are
involved in food service contracting, and potential problem
areas associated with pre-award and post-award of food service
contracts.
A. SERVICE CONTRACTS DEFINED
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a service
contract as: [Ref. 3: part 37.101]
... a contract that directly engages the time and effort
of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an
identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of
supply. A service contract may be either a nonpersonal or
personal contract. It can also cover services performed
by either professional or nonprofessional personnel
whether on an individual basis or organizational basis.
Other than food services, these contracts are normally for
maintenance, housekeeping, transportation, research and
development, or similar services.
It is important to understand the distinction between
personal and nonpersonal services. A nonpersonal services
contract is one in which the [Ref. 3: part 37.101]
. . . personnel rendering the services are not subject,
either by the contract's terms or by the manner of its
administration, to supervision and control usually
prevailing in relationships between the Government and its
employees.
On the other hand, a personal services contract "makes the
contractor personnel appear, in effect, Government employees".
[Ref. 3: part 37.101] Contracting personnel must fully
understand these differences. The FAR prohibits the use of
personal service contracts unless authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109.
Normally, the Government must obtain its employees by directly
hiring under the civil service laws.
B. FOOD SERVICE CONTRACTS DEFINED
Food service contracts are nonpersonal contracts which
provide for food service support under three basic arrange-
ments: full food services, management and food preparation
services, and dining facility attendant services. Full food
service contracts encompass all aspects of dining facility
management, food preparation, menu planning, food ordering,
and dining facility attendant services. Management and food
preparation service contracts are essentially for full food
service less dining facility attendant services. Under this
arrangement, dining facility attendant services are performed
by military personnel. This arrangement is normally found at
basic training installations. Contracts for dining facility
attendant services involve only those activities required to
perform sanitation, custodial, and limited food preparation
duties.
C. SERVICE CONTRACT ACT OF 19 65
The Service Contract Act of 1965, effective 19 January
1966 extended Federal minimum wage, fringe benefits and
working condition standards, to all contracts and subcontracts
thereunder for services, such as laundry and dry cleaning,
guard services, food services, custodial and janitorial
duties, packing and crating, and miscellaneous housekeeping
functions in excess of $2,500.00. The law specifies that
service contracts in excess of $2,500.00 must require that the
contractor pay employees the prevailing wage rate for the
locality as determined by the Secretary of Labor, including
fringe benefits as an element of wages. Successor contractors
are required to pay wage rates and fringe benefits based on
those agreed to by the predecessor contractors in collective
bargaining agreements when the new service contract is for
substantially the same work and will be performed at the same
location. In no case can the wage rate be less than that
provided under the Fair Labor Standards Acts. In addition to
its wage rate provisions, the law also covers safety standards
and sanitary working conditions. [Ref. 4:p. H-4-14]
The effect of this act was to provide the same protection to
service employees that the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act
and Davis-Bacon Act provided supply and construction
employees.
A serious problem of the Service Contract Act involves
successor contracts. The Act requires that when the
Government awards a successor contract for work previously
under contract, the successor contract must pay the employees
at least as much in wages and fringe benefits as contained in
the predecessor's collective bargaining contract. The
Department of Labor extended the provision to all continuing
requirements for services even though the work might be
performed in different locations. The Office of Federal
Procurement Policy felt that the successorship provision be
applied only in circumstances where substantially the same
services are to be performed at the same location as the
previous contract. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy
contended that the existing labor policy acts to restrain
competition for those service contracts where the Government
does not specify a place of performance. If the location of
performance is immaterial to the procuring agency the actual
location of performance may be unknown until a successful
offeror is selected. The Department of Labor requires the
minimum wage determination be based on the rates applicable to
the area where the procurement is located. [Ref. 5:p. A-15]
The Service Contract Act and OMB Circular A-76 are to a
great extent interrelated. OMB Circular A-76 was established
to assure reliance on the private enterprise system for the
products and services needed by the Government to the maximum
extent consistent with effective accomplishment of essential
programs. OMB Circular A-76 requires a comparative cost
analysis prior to the issuance of a service contract to
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determine if functions can be performed at a lower cost to the
Government "in-house" than under a service contract.
Executive agencies must make a comparative cost analysis
between commercial and Government sources, and the cost to be
incurred under each alternative must be determined in
accordance with OMB Circular A-76. Industry spokesmen have
long complained that cost factors used by the Government for
its personnel when making this determination as to whether the
function should be performed in-house or under contract are
generally grossly unrealistic and understated. [Ref. 6:p. A-
23]
OMB Circular A-76 defines the circumstances under which
the Government may provide commercial and industrial products
and services for its own use. Comparative cost analysis must
be used to provide justification for the decision to contract
or accomplish work in-house. This also includes compiling and
maintaining an inventory of commercial or industrial
activities, conducting triennial reviews of these activities
and evaluating "new starts" to determine if the service can be
obtained from commercial sources. Each agency is required to
develop a schedule for the review of all its commercial and
industrial activities and the contracting out of those similar
functions. These figures will be made available to the
public. There will also be an objective review of appeals
from A-76 determinations. The one area not intended for cost
analysis is research and development. [Ref. 7: p. A-l-2]
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D. PRE-AWARD CONSIDERATIONS
1. Preparation of the Performance Work Statement
As soon as the decision is made to formally consider
the use of a service contract, the installation should begin
to prepare the performance work statement (PWS) . A perfor-
mance work statement is defined as: [Ref. 8: p. 4]
A document that describes accurately the essential and
technical requirements for items, materials, or services
including the standards used to determine whether the
requirements have been met.
The PWS is prepared by the activity that requires the
work be performed, with help from the contracting office and
the base management office. The PWS for food service
contracts is normally prepared by the base food service
office. They are the organization that has the responsibility
to define the requirements. Additionally, the PWS is reviewed
by a legal representative to assure it is suitable for a
contract.
For contract administration to be effective, the
contract must contain an adequate performance work statement
(PWS) . The PWS should describe the performance to be
accomplished by the contractor, and furnish reasonable
performance standards to measure the quality of work. The
performance requirement summary identifies required services,
performance standards, maximum allowable deviations from the
standards, methods of surveillance, and deductions from the
contract price for exceeding the maximum allowable deviation.
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An element critically important to the service
acquisition process is an accurate description of the
performance required. The essential performance requirements
for the service are described in the contract specifications.
Based on the specifications, the other elements of the
acquisition process are initiated. The method of acquisition
is determined, a source list is compiled, the contract terms
and conditions are established, the service is performed, and
the results are evaluated.
If the specifications are inadequate or inconsistent,
legal and administrative problems could be encountered. Some
of the effects of inadequate specifications are:
1. Increases in contract prices
2
.
Substandard performance by contractors
3. Delays in delivering services
4. Litigation
5. Increases in contract administration costs
The specifications are contained in the performance
work statement (PWS) , which is part of the solicitation. The
PWS describes the required output desired. The PWS should be
based on the most current workload data available.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has
recently issued a Policy Letter concerning service
contracting. It emphasizes the use of performance require-
ments and quality standards in defining contract requirements,
13
source selection, and quality assurance. The OFPP stated in
this Policy Letter that: [Ref. 2:p. 504]
It is the policy of the Federal Government that (1)
agencies use performance-based contracting methods to the
maximum extent practicable, when acquiring services, and
(2) agencies carefully select acquisition and contract
administration strategies, methods, and techniques that
best accommodate the requirements. In addition, agencies
shall justify the use of other than performance-based
contracting methods when acquiring services, and document
affected contract files.
Performance-based contracting means structuring all
aspects of an acquisition around the purpose of the work to be
performed as opposed to either the manner by which the work is
to be performed or broad and imprecise statements of work.
This OFPP Policy Letter further defines how the PWS should be
structured: [Ref. 2:p. 104]
When preparing statements of work, agencies shall, to the
maximum extent practicable, describe the work in terms of
"what" is to be the required output rather that "how" the
work is to be accomplished. To assist in refining state-
ments of work, consideration shall be given to issuing
draft solicitations.
Additionally, this OFPP Policy Letter states that when
an agency is acquiring services which previously have been
provided by contract, they shall rely on experience gained
from the prior contract to incorporate performance-based
acquisition methods. For such follow-on requirements, the PWS
shall further describe the services in terms of "what" is to
be performed, and performance standards and surveillance plans
shall be more definitive than those for the prior acquisition.
[Ref. 2: p. 505] Therefore, the emphasis of the OFPP Policy
Letter relevant to the PWS is as follows: (1) For the initial
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procurement of a service the PWS should be written in more
general terms "what" is to be required, and (2) for repetitive
(follow-on) requirements the PWS will be written in more
definitive terms based on experience gained. This policy is
a major change in the way PWS for services, specifically, food
service contracts have been written in the past. The majority
of PWS for services have been structured in detail describing
how to perform each task.
2. Quality Assurance
The responsibility for quality control rests solely
with the contractor. The Government will inspect the work but
only to insure contract compliance by the contractor. This
Government inspection is known as quality assurance (QA)
.
The OFPP has addressed the area of quality assurance
in its recent policy letter as follows: [Ref. 2:p. 504]
Agencies shall, to the maximum extent practicable, assign
contractors full responsibility for quality performance.
Agencies shall develop formal, measurable (i.e., in terms
of quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.) performance
standards and surveillance plans to facilitate the
assessment of contractor performance and the use of
performance incentives and deduction schedules. Agencies
shall, to the maximum extent practicable, avoid relying on
cumbersome and intrusive process-oriented inspection and
oversight programs to assess contractor performance.
QA is a difficult area that must be planned for while
the PWS is being developed. Again, the activity that requires
the service is responsible for the Quality Assurance or
Surveillance Plan. This plan is: "An organized written
document used for quality assurance surveillance. The
document contains sample guides, checklists, and decision
15
tables." [Ref. 8:p. 4] The plan is developed along with the
PWS. These plans are normally based on statistical sampling
techniques, therefore, developing the plans require some
expertise.
The plan should include a sampling guide that states
what will be checked, the required standard of performance or
acceptable quality level (AQL) , decision tables that assist in
determining who is at fault for deficiences, and a checklist.
[Ref. 8:p. 15]
A Government quality assurance surveillance plan is
essential to insure that services required by the contract are
performed at an acceptable quality level. The objectives of
the plan are to detect unsatisfactory performance, identify
causes, and take corrective action when unacceptable
performance is not corrected.
The Government uses five different methods of
monitoring contractors' performance. They are random
sampling, planned sampling, 100% inspection, validated
complaints, and unscheduled inspection.
Random sampling uses a statistical approach to choose
a percentage of the total work that a contractor is performing
and inspecting that work. The amount sampled is determined
from a sample size table found in MIL-STD-105D. It is based
on the number of times an item occurs and the AQL for the
item. Individual samples are chosen by a random number table.
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Planned sampling is used when the Government personnel
monitoring the contract want to place specific emphasis on a
certain portion of the contract. To use this method, the
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) or
Quality Assurance Evaluator (QAE) develops a schedule of which
area they will look at and at what frequency.
One hundred percent inspection is a system used only
on contracts that contain infrequent, highly critical work
items. If the Government inspects all of the contractor's
work, it is very time consuming and should only be specified
when that level of supervision is required. If a work item is
critical and frequent analysis must be done, a decision must
be made that weighs the costs of 100% inspection against the
risks of not examining each item.
Customer awareness is the key to using the validated
complaints method. Customers (i.e., users of the dining
facility) notify the COTR/QAE when the contractor is not
performing properly and the COTR/QAE verifies the complaint.
This notification normally occurs by use of customer complaint
forms.
Unscheduled inspection is done by the COTR/QAE simply
conducting an inspection whenever it is felt that there is a
need to do so. Because the contractor may consider
unscheduled inspections arbitrary, this type of inspection
should be avoided unless there are specific reasons why the
other methods cannot be used.
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Each of these types of inspections should be
considered as the quality assurance plan is being developed
and the best combination chosen to support the PWS.
3. Deductions
Deductions are used to reimburse the Government for
work that was not performed or was not performed within the
AQL by the contractor. The amount of deduction should
represent the cost of the item of work in question. The
deduction is figured using a deduction formula normally found
in the quality assurance plan.
To insure reasonable deductions are determined, the
PWS and the quality assurance checklist must list critical
tasks required by the contractor and related subtasks. A
corresponding deduction percentage must also be assigned to
each critical task and related subtask. It is important that
deduction percentages be assigned to subtasks, not only to
critical tasks. This point was highlighted by a decision of
the Comptroller General of the United States. [Ref. 9]
Performance requirements summaries in invitation for bids
for services contracts which permit the Government to
deduct from the contractor's payments an amount
representing the value of several tasks where a random
sample inspection reveals a defect in only one task
imposes an unreasonable penalty, unless the agency shows
the deductions are reasonable in light of the particular
procurement's circumstances.
4. Contract Type
Presently the FAR requires that service contracts be
awarded through sealed bidding if the requirements for this
method of solicitation exist. [Ref. 3:part. 37-105] By
18
definition then, the contract awarded will be either firm
fixed-price or fixed-price with economic price adjustment.
Using sealed bidding and a firm fixed-price contract for
services has the advantage of transfering the majority of the
financial risk onto the contractor. Additionally, it promotes
competition between different contractors. The contract type
most freguently awarded for food services is a firm fixed-
price contract. Cost type contracts are not often used or
recommended in the food service environment.
Although competition is considered extremely important
by Congress, this type of contract does not always provide the
best service to the installation. Contractors tend to
sacrifice quality in order to control their costs when
assuming the majority of the financial risk in performing a
complex service. Awarding a firm fixed-price contract to
acquire a complex service affords only limited opportunity to
reduce costs without adversely affecting the quality of
service. This, coupled with the problem that service contract
performance work statements tend to be inaccurate or at least
subject to ambiguous interpretations, highlights the potential
difficulty of blindly using sealed bidding and firm fixed-
price contracts for all services. [Ref. 10:p. 17]
Contract types most likely to motivate contractors to
perform at optimal levels should be chosen. The OFPP has
recently defined the use of contract type for acquiring
services as follows: [Ref. 2:p. 505]
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Fixed price contracts are appropriate for services that
can be objectively defined and for which risk of perform-
ance is manageable. In most instances, services that are
routine, frequently acquired, and require no more than a
minimal acceptable level of performance fall into this
category. For such acquisitions, performance-based
statements of work and measurable performance standards
and surveillance plans shall be developed and fixed price
contracts shall be preferred over cost reimbursement
contracts. Cost reimbursement contracts are appropriate
for services that can only be defined in general terms and
for which risk of performance is not reasonably manage-
able. Complex or unique services for which quality of
performance is paramount frequently fall into this
category.
Even though the use of firm fixed-price contracts for
complex services appear to have a negative impact upon the
quality of service provided by a contractor, the General
Accounting Office has stated that installations are using too
many cost type contracts and are not justifying the decision
fully in accordance with law and regulation. [Ref . 11: pp. 30-
39]
5. Incentives
The use of incentives or award fees reward contractors
for good performance, thus motivating the contractor to
perform above, not below the established minimal acceptable
levels. Incorporating only deductions for poor performance
without also including incentive provisions in the contract
will tend to discourage contractors from competing, dedicating
their best personnel, and putting forth their best efforts.
Therefore, incorporating incentive provisions along with
quality assurance deduction schedules into service contracts
will motivate contractors to perform at maximum efficiency.
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The subject of incentives has been addressed by the OFPP as
follows: [Ref. 2:p. 505]
To the maximum extent practicable, contracts shall include
incentive provisions to ensure contractors are rewarded
for good performance and quality insurance deduction
schedules to discourage unsatisfactory performance. These
provisions shall be based on measurement against predeter-
mined performance standards and surveillance plans.
6. Selection Procedures
One of the final steps in the pre-award phase of
service contracting is source selection. Source selection in
the arena of service contracts, particularly food services,
should place emphasis on attracting and selecting competent
and quality oriented contractors in addition to obtaining the
lowest price. Inattention to quality-related factors leads to
the selection of contractors with marginal capability who
submit the lowest prices but then perform at unsatisfactory
levels. Therefore, it is apparent that other than price
related factors must be considered in evaluation and selection
of a food service contractor. The OFPP has defined the policy
for source selection procedures as follows: [Ref. 2: p. 504]
Agencies shall use competitive negotiations for acquisi-
tions where the quality of performance over and above the
minimum acceptable level will enhance agency mission
accomplishment and be worth the corresponding increase in
cost. In such instances, contracting activities shall
give careful consideration to developing evaluation and
selection procedures that utilize quality-related factors
such as: technical capability; management capability;
cost realism; and past performance. These factors shall
receive increased emphasis to the extent requirements are
more complex and less clearly defined. The desired
relative importance among these factors and between these
factors and price shall be applied as stated in the
solicitation.
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Based upon the aforementioned policy of the OFPP, the
use of discussions/negotiations in the service contract
selection process will enhance not only both parties
understanding of the contract requirements, but also the
likelihood of receiving the greatest quality in the service
performed. Additionally, the OFPP further states "Sealed
bidding shall be used when the goal of the acquisition is to
achieve the desired service at the lowest price with minimum
stated acceptable quality." [Ref. 2: p. 504] This new policy
set by the OFPP will have a drastic impact upon the food
service acquisition process. Most food service contracts have
been awarded using the sealed bid process.
E. PROCUREMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF SERVICES
The contracting officer that solicits for and awards a
contract is known as the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO)
.
The contracting officer that administers the contract is
called the Administrative Contracting Officer. In food
service contracting the PCO normally performs both these
functions and is located at the installation where the service
is performed. When the contract PCO and ACO are not located
at the installation where the service is to be performed the
Contracting Officers Technical Representative becomes the only
Government representative on the installation. The COTR must
manage the contract without daily guidance and support from
the PCO or ACO. This situation requires the utmost
coordination and communication between the PCO or ACO and the
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COTR. The COTR for most food service contracts is a resident
food service officer or senior enlisted person.
F. ADMINISTRATION OF SERVICE CONTRACTS
Contract Administration can broadly be defined as "those
activities, on the part of the Government contracting agency,
that takes place during performance of the contract." [Ref.
10: p. 138] From the Government standpoint contract adminis-
tration has two purposes. First: "The broad goals of
contract administration are to assure that the Government
obtains the needed work on time and that the contractor
receives proper compensation." [Ref. 11: p. 1] The secondary
purpose of contract administration is to "protect the public
trust." [Ref. 13 :p. 8]
Contract administration can be broken down into the
following activities: [Ref. 12:p. 141]
Orienting the contractor





Each of these requirements, as they relate to food service
contracts, will be discussed below.
1. Orienting the Contractor
This function is critically important for service
contractors. Unlike the large contractors that provide
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equipment and construction to the Government, service
contractors are likely to be small businesses, to include
small disadvantaged businesses. Proper contract administra-
tion includes ensuring that the contractor fully understands
all the contract requirements and possesses the capacity to
perform. Some explanation of contract requirements should be
accomplished during pre-award negotiations, if they are
conducted. Additionally, after the contract is awarded, a
post-award conference covering all contract requirements must
take place.
Orientation for service contractors is also important
because service contractors, more than any other contractor,
will be providing services for the entire installation. The
potential for conflict with other activities transpiring on
the installation is much higher with service contractors.
The orientation should include but not be limited to:
A discussion of all the locations that will be affected
by the contract
The contractor's limits in moving about the installation
An introduction to the contracting officer's technical
representative (COTR) or Quality Assurance Evaluator
(QAE)
A review of the performance work statement (PWS) to
insure all terms and conditions are understood
A discussion of how invoices should be submitted and
payment forwarded
A discussion of any incentives and deductions, and how
they will be determined
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2. Processing Invoices for Payment
Processing invoices involves assuring that the
contractor receives payment in a timely manner. The Prompt
Payment Act, 31 U. S. C. 3901 et seq. requires: [Ref. 13:p.
877]
Government payment of interest for delays in payment for
a "completed delivered item of property or service," the
"required payment date" is stated to be the date of
payment specified in the contract or "thirty days after
receipt of proper invoice ... if a specific date on
which payment is due is not established by contract."
This is a very important concept that must be adhered to if
the Government is to be a responsible customer and abide by
its laws.
3. Modifying the Contract
Contract modifications or changes are covered in the
changes clause of the contract. This clause gives the
Government the unilateral right to make changes to the
contract. The contractor is obligated to perform any changes
and will be given an equitable adjustment for increased costs.
FAR 52.243-1 lists the types of changes allowed to contracts
that provide nonprofessional services without supplies. The
following may be changed within the scope of a service
contract: [Ref. 3:part. 52.243-1]
1. Description of services to be performed
2. Time of performance (i.e., hours of the day, days of the
week, etc.)
3. Place of performance of the services
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The changes clause provides the contracting officer
with one of the most powerful tools for managing the contract.
An important area of contract administration is finding the
performance areas that were either left out of the contract or
not adequately defined. The contracting officer should always
attempt to resolve these areas with a bilateral supplemental
agreement. If agreement cannot be reached, however, the
changes clause provides the mechanism for getting the
contractor to do the required work. As with any of the
contract administration issues, a professional business
relationship between the contractor and the administrator is
the key to successful contract performance.
4. Resolving Disputes
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U. S. C. 601 et
seq. is implemented in Federal Government contracting by
including a disputes clause in the contract. The clause is
listed in FAR 52.233-1. A dispute arises when a disagreement
about the contract cannot be resolved and a formal claim is
made to the contracting officer.
When a dispute cannot be resolved through negotiation,
the contracting officer makes a final decision on the matter
and informs the contractor. If the contractor is not
satisfied with the contracting officer's decision, the
contractor can appeal to the judicial system or Board of
Contract Appeals for relief. Throughout the appeal process
the contractor must continue to perform the contract in the
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manner set forth in the contracting officer's final decision.
Should the appeal be sustained and find the contracting
officer in error, the contractor will be given an adjustment
to compensate him for his effort.
5. Interpreting the Contract
Contract interpretation is basically the same for
service, supply or construction contracts. "The basic
objective of contract interpretation is to determine the
intent of the parties." [Ref. 13 :p. 103] Because the
Government writes the contract and the Government contracting
officer makes the final decisions on interpretation, the
Government should take extreme care in clearly wording service
contracts to prevent ambiguity problems. This is especially
true in service contracting because the contractors tend to be
less sophisticated.
6. Contract Monitoring
Contract Monitoring is where the Government uses the
Quality Assurance Plan that was developed prior to the award
of the contract. This function is normally delegated by the
contracting officer to the contracting officer's technical
representative (COTR) who executes it through Quality
Assurance Evaluators (QAE)
.
a. Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
Service contracts are normally monitored by a
contracting officer's technical representative (COTR) . The
primary requirement for a COTR is that they be technically
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knowledgeable in the service for which they are responsible.
COTR's are responsible for:
1. Insuring that contractor performance complies with the
technical requirements of the contract
2. Inspecting the quality of the services performed by the
contractor
3. Maintaining detailed inspection records
4. Reporting identified performance problems to the con-
tracting officer
The COTR is assisted by the QAE who are responsible for
inspecting and evaluating contractor performance. COTR's
should be designated in writing, and the designations should
clearly define the scope and limitations of the COTR's
authority.
The COTR's job in contract monitoring is extremely
important and complex. Since COTR's are technical experts and
not contracting specialists, they have to be trained to
perform their duties. COTR training can be a weak link and so
must be planned well in advance. Installations should have an
established program to assure that the COTR is well prepared
to perform the required duties. The responsibility for
providing training to the COTR in the area of monitoring
contract performance is that of the contracting officer. If
COTR's are not properly trained, problems in administration of
the contract are certain to occur, particularly, an adver-
sarial relationship between the Government and the contractor
due to misunderstanding and misinterpretation is likely.
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COTR's and QAE's are the people who manage the
contract for the contracting officer on a daily basis. These
individuals represent the Government on a daily basis with the
contractor's personnel. Normally the contracting officer only
interjects into the relationship to solve problems.
The process of monitoring contractor quality is
the joint responsibility of the contractor and the Government.
This joint process includes the contractor's quality control
program and the Government's quality assurance program.
To insure the contract requirements will be met in
a satisfactory manner, a contractor must prepare a quality
control plan. Specifically, a quality control plan must
include:
1. An acceptable inspection system
2. A method of identifying deficiencies in the quality of
services performed
3. A provision for maintaining records of all inspections
conducted and corrective action taken
The records are to be made available to Government personnel
and should be used, as appropriate, to reduce or increase the
amount of surveillance performed by the Government during the
contract period. [Ref. 3:part 52.246]
The primary objective of the Government's quality
assurance program is to insure that the contractor quality
control program is functioning effectively and will produce
the quality of performance specified in the contract. [Ref.
3:part 46.000]
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The quality assurance plan should provide a
systematic approach to surveillance that will enable
Government evaluators to determine the acceptability of work
completed by a contractor. If unacceptable performance
exceeds certain prescribed levels, payments to the contractor
should be reduced in accordance with a reduction formula
included in the quality assurance plan. Surveillance
inspections by quality assurance personnel should be
sufficiently documented to support payment for satisfactory
performance or to withhold payment for unsatisfactory work or
nonperformance. [Ref. 3: part 46.104] Surveillance is
accomplished by the use of a quality assurance surveillance
plan which contains provisions for conducting inspections to
estimate the contractor's overall level of performance in the
tasks which are performed on a continuous basis.
6. CRITICAL FUNCTIONS IN ADMINISTRATION OF FOOD SERVICE
CONTRACTS
The following is a discussion of the critical areas of
administering food service contracts which require extreme
attention. Without proper planning and implementation these
areas will be prone to problems.
1. Inspection Procedures
The basic guidance for administering contracts is
contained in the FAR part 42. According to the FAR part 42
the contracting officer has primary responsibility for
insuring that a contractor fully complies with the terms of
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the contract. The contracting officer may, however, appoint
other personnel, referred to as the contracting officers'
technical representative (COTR) , to monitor contractor
performance.
Deficiencies in contract surveillance can occur
because of inadequate training and guidance provided to the
COTR's. COTR's should be appointed in writing, and be
provided with written instructions concerning general duties
and responsibilities, appropriate inspection techniques, and
the requirements for documenting and reporting inspection
results. The process of monitoring a contractor's performance
is generally very time-consuming and involves many complex
tasks, such as using statistical sampling techniques and
analyzing various reports prepared by the contractor. Unless
the individuals responsible for monitoring contractor
performance are provided sufficient training and guidance on
appropriate inspection techniques, and are made aware of the
requirements for performing and documenting all inspections,
performance deficiencies will not be detected and reported to
the contracting officer. COTR's must receive the training and
guidance needed to effectively perform their duties.
2. Surveillance Plans
A critical aspect in properly administering a food
service contract is an effective surveillance plan. The basic
purpose of the plan is to assist the COTR in performing
comprehensive and systematic inspections of all aspects of
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contractor performance. A surveillance plan generally
consists of a series of performance requirements summaries.
These summaries should identify, by contract paragraph, the
required services, performance standards for these services,
acceptable quality levels for contractor performance, and
methods of surveillance. The surveillance plan should provide
for monitoring performance through a combination of statis-
tical sampling, customer complaints, and checklists. An
effective surveillance plan must include a disciplined
approach for reviewing all aspects of contractor performance.
Typical problems that can occur in performing
contractor surveillance are:
a. The techniques to design and select samples are
invalid, resulting in inadequate sample sizes and improper
methods for selecting sample items. These inadequate sample
results cannot be used to calculate the amount of payment
reductions for unsatisfactory performance. If a contractor
receives a deduction based upon inadequate sampling procedures
and this improper action cannot be resolved with the contract-
ing officer, litigation is certain to occur and will be
decided in favor of the contractor.
b. The surveillance plan's inspection checklist does
not contain the same amount of tasks that are identified in
the contract. To insure effective surveillance of contractor
performance the checklist must contain the identical tasks
included in the contract.
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c. Investigation into customer complaints is
improper. Customer complaints are normally provided to the
COTR by use of customer complaint forms. Customer complaints
must be aggressively managed. If not aggressively managed,
the contractor may be being paid for services that are
inadequate.
3. Material Testing
The FAR part 52.246 prescribes policies and procedures
for insuring that services performed by contractors conform to
contract specifications. As part of the inspection process
described in the FAR part 52.246 samples of materials provided
by a contractor may be tested prior to the start of work and
periodically while work is in progress. The contract must
include appropriate clauses to require such testing. When the
tests show that the materials provided by the contractor do
not meet contract specifications, the contracting officer
should be notified so that appropriate corrective actions can
be taken. Frequent tests of contractor-furnished materials
(i.e., detergent, condiments, etc.) must be performed to
insure that contractors are furnishing materials of the
quality specified in the contract. If left uninspected, the
customer may be provided with inadequate services, and the




According to the FAR part 32.9 the contracting officer
is responsible for verifying that the services included on
contractors' invoices have been adequately performed prior to
authorizing payment to the contractors. Generally, in food
service contracts a contracting officer appoints COTR's to
certify, through inspection reports or other documentation,
that the work included on contractor invoices was completed in
a satisfactory manner. These certifications then serve as the
basis for the contracting officer to approve payment of the
invoices submitted by a contractor. When services are not
performed in accordance with contract requirements the COTR
should prepare a contract discrepancy report. These reports
are submitted to the contractor, who is then responsible for
correcting the deficiencies. If the contractor does not
correct the identified deficiencies within the specified time-
frames, the COTR should notify the contracting officer. The
contracting officer should then reduce the contractor's
payment to compensate the Government for any services which
were not provided. Adequate procedures must be implemented to
review and approve contractor invoices and to assess penalties
for inadequate performance or uncorrected deficiencies. If
these procedures are inadequate, contractors may be paid for
services which were not performed or were not performed in
accordance with contract requirements. Additionally, unless
a contracting officer requires certification that the services
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included in the contractors' invoices were performed in
accordance with contract requirements there are no assurances
that the payments made to the contractors are appropriate.
5. Contract Modifications
After a contract is awarded price adjustments should
not be made for the original work. Changes in requirements,
however, frequently result in modifications to the original
contract. Policies and procedures for modifying contracts are
contained in the FAR and Department of Defense supplements to
the FAR. The FAR 43.103 classifies contract modifications in
two types: bilateral (supplemental agreement) or unilateral
(change order) . Supplemental agreements, which are referred
to as bilateral modifications, generally result from
negotiations between contractors and the contracting officers.
The normal sequence for processing a supplemental agreement
begins when a contracting officer issues a written notice of
proposed changes to the work and requests a price proposal
from the contractor. Normally, the contractor must submit the
proposal within 3 days after receipt of the notice. An
independent Government estimate is prepared to assist the
contracting officer in evaluating the contractor's proposal.
Following evaluation of the proposal, a price is negotiated
and the contractor is notified to start work.
If a price cannot be negotiated in a reasonable time
consideration should be given to issuing a change order, which
is referred to as a unilateral modification. The change order
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is a written notice (Standard Form 30) signed by the contract-
ing officer directing the contractor to make certain changes
in the products or services being provided. These changes can
be directed without the contractor's consent. When a change
order is issued, the contractor can either accept the price
established by the Government or submit a claim for a higher
amount
.
When delays are experienced in negotiating a modifica-
tion the Government experiences an unreasonable amount of risk
because the contractor has the benefit of knowing actual costs
prior to agreeing to the price for the modification. When a
contractor delays negotiations the contracting officer should
establish an equitable price for the work and issue a
unilateral modification.
The FAR 15.808 requires that a record of price
negotiations, called a price negotiation memorandum, should be
prepared for every modification. The record should include
the contractor's proposal, the independent Government
estimate, the negotiated price, and an explanation of any
variances between the estimate and the negotiated price.
Problems can occur if price negotiations are not fully
documented and the records not maintained on file. For
example, if independent Government estimates are not included,
and no explanations are provided as to how the contracting
officer arrived at the price, then it is difficult to insure
that a fair and reasonable price was reached for both parties.
36
H. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the reader with
terms, laws, procedures, and documentation peculiar to food
service contracting. Additionally, this chapter discussed the
actions and associated documentation necessary in both the
pre-award and post-award phases. Critical personnel involved
in the process were identified, and potential problem areas
were also highlighted.
In summary, the successful administration and performance
of food service contracts relies heavily upon proper pre-award
planning and actions. The entire process from the very
beginning must be a team effort between the contracting
officer, the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
(COTR) , and the civilian contractor. Therefore, this thesis
will present and analyze valuable input received from
contracting officers, COTR's, and civilian food service
contractors.
The next chapter is a case summary of relevant judicial
proceedings where food service contractors have sought relief
from the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) , and
have protested Government actions to the Comptroller General
of the United States. This case summary will initiate an
analysis to uncover problem trends in the administration of
food service contracts and pre-award causes of these problems.
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III. ANALYSIS OF ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT
APPEALS (ASBCA) CASES AND PROTESTS TO THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL (CG)
This chapter summarizes ASBCA cases and Comptroller
General decisions relevant to food service procurement actions
for the years 1985 to present. A total of 21 ASBCA cases and
55 Comptroller General decisions were reviewed. Appendix A is
the list of ASBCA cases reviewed and Appendix B lists the
protests to the Comptroller General that were reviewed.
The purpose of the chapter is twofold: (1) to identify
the difficulties encountered in the administration and
performance of food service contracts, which could not be
resolved between the contracting officer and the contractor,
thus resulting in a litigation action; and (2) to identify
pre-award problems, to include pre-award causes of post-award
difficulties.
The intent of this chapter is to conduct a trend analysis
regarding the reasons for claims submitted to the ASBCA that
could not be resolved at the contracting officer level and the
reason for submission of protests to the Comptroller General.
The intent was not to conduct a trend analysis of the
decisions made by the judges of the ASBCA, or the Comptroller
General of the United States.
The most frequent reason for a claim submitted to the
ASBCA and the most frequent reason for a submission of a
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protest to the Comptroller General will be discussed in
detail, including an actual case summary of an appeal and a
protest which are indicative of the most common trends.
A. ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS (ASBCA) CASE
ANALYSIS
All ASBCA cases from 1985 to present were reviewed and are
listed in Appendix A. A trend analysis approach was used to
determine the most frequent reason for a contractor submitting
a claim to the ASBCA. Additionally, all reasons for the
submittal of claims are presented along with their frequency.
In all ASBCA cases reviewed, not only were the post-award
difficulties addressed, but also the pre-award causes of the
post-award difficulties were identified. Therefore, the
format of this analysis will list the post-award difficulty
along with the pre-award cause identified in the case with the
subsequent frequency of occurrence. As the result of multiple
occurrences of post-award difficulties and pre-award causes of
these difficulties in some of the ASBCA cases reviewed, the
reader will realize that in some instances, the total of the
post-award difficulties and pre-award causes will be more than
21, which is the number of cases reviewed.
The following is the result of the ASBCA case analysis
listing the post-award difficulty, which was the reason for
the submission of the claim, along with the pre-award cause of
the difficulty, listed in descending order of frequency.
1. Reason for claim: The food service contractor felt
that services were being demanded that were outside
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the scope of the requirements listed in the
performance work statement (PWS)
.
This post-award difficulty was a reason for a claim in
15 of the 21 cases. The specific areas addressed included:
cleaning extra items; providing a snack line; performing
additional labor hours; renovation of a dining facility;
increased work load; number of meals served were greater than
requirement in contract; change in messing equipment caused
increase in cleaning costs; misunderstanding of requirements;
expenses incurred that were not known at time of submission of
bid/proposal; expending more man hours than anticipated; and
perform food preparation which was not listed as a contract
requirement. All of these areas were either not addressed in
the contract, ordered by the COTR, or the result of ambiguous
contract language.
1. Pre-award causes:
Specifications listed in the PWS were either
deficient or ambiguous.
In the 15 instances that the contractor felt that
services were being demanded outside the scope of the contract
requirements, ambiguous or deficient specifications in the PWS
was cited in 11 cases. Specific areas addressed were:
ambiguous language in a cleaning section of the contract;
solicitation did not require a snack line which was needed;
performance requirement summary was deficient; PWS grossly
underestimated number of meals required; and contractor did
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not understand contract language and failed to clarify prior
to submitting bid.
Contractor made a mistake in preparing the
proposal/bid
.
This pre-award cause appeared in three of the 15
instances. In all three cases involving a mistake in
submission of an offer, the contractor was aware of the meal
requirement but underestimated the number of labor hours
required to provide the service.
No on-site visit by contractor prior to submission
of bid/proposal.
This cause occurred in one of the 15 cases. In this
instance, the contractor had the opportunity to conduct an on-
site visit and declined to do so. This declination was a
result of the contractor having had prior experience in food
service contracts and felt the visit was not necessary.
2 . Reason for claim: The food service contractor felt
that payments were incorrectly reduced as a result of
improper inspection techniques.
This post award difficulty was a reason for a claim in
seven of the 21 cases. This area is extremely important to a
food service contractor because if unsatisfactory results are
received on the inspection their payments could be reduced by
the reduction formula contained within the contract. Specific
areas addressed were: improper monetary deduction; and
improper inspection standards. The majority of inspections
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conducted are done by the COTR/QAE based upon the requirements
set forth in the contract.
2. Pre-award causes; In all seven cases that exhibited
this post-award difficulty, the claim was a result of the
Government and the contractor interpreting the inspection
requirements and procedures differently. The reason for the
different interpretations was the result of ambiguous contract
specifications and inspection clauses. Additionally, in three
of the seven cases improper training and follow-up of the
COTR/QAE by the contracting officer was cited as a pre-award
cause of this post-award difficulty.
3
.
Reason for claim: The contractor felt that an
adversarial relationship between himself and the
COTR/QAE disrupted efficient operations.
This post-award difficulty was a reason for a claim in
two of the 21 cases. The contractor specified that this
adversarial relationship was the major cause of their
inability to perform food services efficiently.
3. Pre-award cause: In both instances, the cause of this
adversarial relationship was documented as having stemmed from
improper training and follow-up of the COTR/QAE on the part of
the contracting officer. If the COTR/QAE are not properly
trained and educated on the contract requirements prior to
award of the contract, the administration and performance of
the contract will not beqin as a cooperative evolution.
4 Reason for claim: The final reason was that a
contract was extended at a price not agreed upon by
the Government and the contractor.
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4. Pre-award cause: In both cases, the disagreement in
extended contract price was the result of the ambiguous
language contained in the contract clause.
In conducting this trend analysis of the ASBCA cases
for post-award difficulties and pre-award causes of specific
post-award difficulties the following additional areas were
discovered.
In 18 of the 21 cases analyzed, Sealed Bid was used
as the method of procurement. Sealed Bid is the preferred
method when, among other things, the requirement and
specifications can be well defined by the Government.
However, as addressed above, the majority of the post-award
difficulties were caused by ambiguous or deficient contract
specifications
.
In 19 of the 21 cases a firm fixed-price contract
was the type of contract awarded. This appears to be the
result of the use of sealed bid as the primary method of
procurement. When sealed bid is used, only a firm fixed-price
or firm fixed-price with economic price adjustment contract
may be awarded.
In ten of the 21 cases the contractor submitting
the claim was a Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB)
.
Contracting agencies in some cases use their food service
contract actions to meet their established SDB goal.
To provide the reader with a better understanding of
the circumstances surrounding a claim submitted by a
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contractor for the most frequent reason discovered during this
case analysis, the following summary of an actual ASBCA case
is provided. This case is not only an example of a claim for
services outside the scope of the contract, it is also
indicative of the majority of the post-award difficulties
discovered during this analysis.
Board Case: Eagle Management, Inc. (EMI), ASBCA No. 35902,
November 30, 1989. Contract No. F38606-87-C-0003 [Ref. 14:p.
22, 513]
Essence of Litigation: The contractor seeks additional
compensation for providing salads, pastries, and desserts on
a snack line as well as on the main serving line. This
requirement was called for on the service wide daily menu;
however, the sample menu provided with the solicitation did
not include this requirement. When bidding on the contract,
the contractor relied upon the sample menu provided as an
indication of the daily requirements. Additionally, the
contractor seeks compensation for cleaning Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) not listed in the contract.
Findings of Fact:
1. Contract F38606-87-C-0003, a small business set-aside
contract for mess attendant services was awarded to EMI
on 12 September 1986. The contract included options
for two successive one-year terms after the initial
term. The contract price was a fixed price per
individual meal served. The total estimated price for
the first year was $326,193.09.
2. EMI began performance as scheduled on 1 October 1986.
The contract work consisted generally of preparing
specified food items (but not cooking) , serving the
food, performing cashier services, and cleaning the
mess hall facilities, equipment and utensils.
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3. Detailed specifications of the services to be performed
and the quality standards to be met were set forth in
the PWS and the attached technical exhibits. Pastry
items, salads and desserts were not listed under the
"SNACK LINE" heading contained in the PWS. EMI
submitted its bid based upon the information contained
in the PWS.
4. After contract award, EMI was directed to stock the
snack line, as well as the main serving line, with
salads, pastries and desserts.
5. A list of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) provided
in the PWS as a technical exhibit was relied upon by
EMI in submitting a bid as indicating the scope of the
required equipment and utensil cleaning.
6. When EMI began performance of the contract, it found
additional GFE in the mess halls which required
cleaning and which had not been listed in the technical
exhibit of the PWS.
7. As a result of the additional GFE found EFI estimated
the additional time required to clean the GFE to be 985
man minutes per day, while the Government's estimate
was 267 man minutes per day based upon the Quality
Assurance Evaluator's (QAE's) estimate.
8. Attempt to negotiate a settlement failed; therefore,
the Government issued unilateral Modification P00004
based upon its estimate.
9. Under the inspection and acceptance provisions of the
contract, EMI's performance was subject to inspection
by Government QAE's. Performance deficiencies found by
the QAE's could be the basis for reduction in contract
payment.
10. Paragraph 10 of Section H of the contract stated that
the Government shall not exercise any supervision or
control over the contractor's employees. The employees
are accountable not to the Government, but solely to
the contractor, who in turn is responsible to the
Government
.
11. The mess hall superintendent for the Government was the
chief QAE and was assigned to monitor EMI's perfor-
mance.
12. The chief QAE and other QAE's under his supervision
gave instructions directly to EMI's staff, without
going to EMI's management, particularly, EMI's on-site
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manager; gave conflicting instructions; dictated
specific personnel assignments; and otherwise
interfered with, harassed and intimidated EMI's staff.
13. The interference, harassment, and intimidation by the
QAE's reduced the efficiency of EMI's employees in all
aspects of the work including the cleaning of the
additional GFE.
14. By unilateral Modification P00005 dated 1 June 1987,
the contract was terminated for convenience of the
Government effective 1 July 1987.
15. On 12 August 1987, the contracting officer received a
certified claim for price adjustment from EMI which
included services provided for the snack line, and for
services required for cleaning the additional GFE.
16. By letter dated 2 October 1987, the contracting officer
denied all items listed in EMI's 10 August 1987 claim.
Summary of Case: This case contained the following post-award
difficulties:
EMI was required to perform services outside the scope of
the contract requirements by providing items for a snack
line not addressed in the solicitation.
EMI was required to clean GFE that was not addressed in
the solicitation.
- An adversarial relationship existed between the con-
tractor and the QAE's which inhibited efficient perfor-
mance and administration of the contract.
A modification to the contract was issued unilaterally by
the Government as a result of both parties not agreeing
upon a price.
The contract was terminated for convenience by the
Government.
The following pre-award causes of the aforementioned
post-award difficulties were identified in this case:
The solicitation when drafted failed to identify the
requirements for a snack line and did not list all GFE
required to be cleaned.
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The QAE's were not adequately trained in performing their
duties prior to contract award.
The QAE's were not fully educated on the requirements of
the contract prior to contract award.
B. ANALYSIS OF PROTESTS TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
All protests to the Comptroller General from 1985 to
present were reviewed and are contained in Appendix B. Again,
a trend analysis approach was used to determine the most
frequent reason for initiating a protest action. The five
most frequent reasons for protest are identified and include
a brief discussion. Other reasons for protest that were
discovered are also listed. This analysis was used as another
avenue to identify pre-award problems which without discovery
could go on to be a cause of post-award difficulties. To
provide the reader with a better understanding of the primary
reason discovered for a protest, a summary of an actual
protest will be provided.
The following is the result of the analysis conducted for
protests submitted to the Comptroller General. The five most
frequent reasons are listed in order of frequency.
1. Original solicitation released by the Government
contained deficiencies resulting in multiple amendments to the
solicitation.
In 25 of the 55 protests reviewed, this reason for a
protest was cited. Some of the specific reasons multiple
amendments to the original solicitation resulted in a protest
are as follows: confusion on the part of the contractor;
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contractors not meeting a change in the required submission
date addressed in an amendment; and contractors not receiving
an amendment at all.
This most frequent reason for protest is a result of
the contracting agency releasing an invitation for bid (IFB)
or request for proposal (RFP) and then discovering an error or
omission causing an amendment to be issued to correct the
deficiency. The most common reason for the Government to
amend an IFB or RFP is that the requirements originally
included are either overstated or understated. In other
words, the solicitation is released prior to accurately
identifying the agency's need. Amending a solicitation not
only confuses the offerors, but also the contracting agency
itself.
2. Protestor found not to be responsive or responsible by
contracting officer.
This was the reason for protest in six of the 55
instances reviewed. The decision of responsibility and
responsiveness rests with the contracting officer. At times
the offeror will be found to be not responsible or responsive.
The contracting officer should notify these offerors
immediately that the company will not be considered for source
selection.
3. The Government changed the food service contract from
a past Small Business Set-aside to strictly a Small
Disadvantaged Business Set-aside.
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This occurred in six of the 55 protests reviewed. All
of the protests were originated by a Small Business contractor
in response to a decision by the contracting officer to
procure the food service from a Small Disadvantaged Business
only, and not in the total realm of Small Business.
4
.
The protest was a result of multiple Best and Final
Offers (BAFO's) prior to award of the contract.
This reason occurred in five of 55 protests. The use
of more than one BAFO during negotiations/discussions has
given the appearance of auctioneering, and therefore, should
be avoided. As a result of this auctioneering appearance in
using more than one BAFO, Under Secretary of the Navy, G.
Lawrence Garrett III, issued a memorandum that addressed that
more than one BAFO only be authorized if approved by the head
of the contracting agency in other than formal source
selection, and the approval of the Navy Acquisition Executive
for use in formal source selection. [Ref. 15: p. 2] As a
result of this awareness in the use of more than one BAFO
during negotiations, this type of protest should not occur in
the future
.
5. Protestor was low offeror in terms of price, but was
not awarded contract as a result of being found not
technically qualified.
This reason occurred in four of 55 protests. This
situation will normally occur when other than price related
factors are used as source selection evaluation criteria,
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specifically, when competitive procurement (negotiations) is
the acquisition method. In this scenario the contractor that
offers the most advantageous service to the Government
considering all relevant factors (price, technical . . . etc.)
as per section M of the RFP will be selected.
Other reasons for protest discovered during this
analysis are as follows:
Protestor submitted lowest bid, corrected an obvious
mistake, and subsequently was no longer the lowest
bidder.
Requirement was previously strictly Small Disadvantaged
Business (SDB) setaside. Contracting officer changed to
Small Business setaside.
Original solicitation canceled due to error made in
determining requirements. New solicitation was not
reissued, but instead was awarded to a Small
Disadvantaged Business through the Small Business
Administration
.
Two-step sealed bid process was used, the contracting
officer did not address bonding requirement until step
two.
Protestor found not to be eligible for the Small
Disadvantaged Business Program.
Government allowed offeror to correct a mistake in a bid
making them the lowest bidder.
Past contract was awarded using the sealed bid method,
new procurement utilized competitive procurement method.
Retired Government official who was previously involved
in this procurement is now employed by an offeror.
Interim contract awarded non-competitively based on
urgent and compelling need which was the result of delays
in preparing the PWS.
Government use of competitive procurement method in order
to award a Cost Reimbursement type contract.
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The following is a summary of an actual protest action
that is indicative of a protest in response to the Government
issuing multiple amendments to its original solicitation as a
result of deficiencies in the solicitation.
Protest: Comptroller General Decision No. B-222405.4,
February 26, 1987 [Ref. 16:p. 100, 724]
Essence of Protest: Integrity Management International, Inc.
protests the cancellation of invitation for bid (IFB) No.
DAKF03-86-B0014 , issued by the Government for food services at
an installation. The protestor challenges the Government's
basis for canceling the IFB and requests recovery of the costs
incurred in anticipation of receiving award under the IFB, as
well as its bid preparation costs, and costs incurred as the
result of filing and pursuing the protest.
Findings of Fact:
1. The IFB, issued on 5 November 1985, as a small business
setaside, called for award of a fixed-price requirements
contract for full food services.
2. From 6 November 1985 through 20 August 1986, 18
amendments to the IFB were issued. While most involved
postponing the bid opening date and other minor
revisions, at least five of the amendments made numerous
substantive changes to the IFB.
3. Because of the delay resulting from the amendments, the
basic contract period was changed from 1 January 1986 to
30 April 1986, to 1 October 1986 to 30 April 1987, with
two one year options.
4. Bid opening was held on 3 September 1986. Sixteen firms
submitted bids ranging form $5.6 million to $24 million;
the Government estimate was $16.2 million.
5. The apparent low bidder was allowed to withdraw its bid,
the protestor, the second low bidder, was in line for
award. Because of the difference between the
protestor's bid ($9.1 million) and the Government
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estimate ($16.2 million), however, the contracting
officer found the protestor nonresponsible, concluding
that the protestor lacked the financial capacity to
incur a potential $7 million loss over the life of the
contract.
6. By letter dated 24 October 1986, the Army notified the
protestor that the IFB had been canceled.
7
.
The Government stated that the IFB was canceled because
of numerous defective provisions, which either misstated
the Government's needs, or made it virtually impossible
for the bidders to determine the Government's actual
requirements. Examples included are:
The estimate in the IFB for the number of meals to
be served was based on a three month period which
the Government later determined was not a
representative sample.
The IFB failed to provide for incorporation of the
quality assurance plan into the contract which was
referenced in one of the technical exhibits.
The IFB required field feeding of troops but had no
provision in the bidding schedule for payment for
the service, and lacked any workload data with
regard to the requirement that the contractor pick
up, deliver and unload food supplies.
Additionally, in the Government's view, the sheer
number of amendments caused great difficulty in its
own accurate tracking of the revisions to the IFB.
Summary of Protest: The Government conceded that the numerous
defects found in the IFB, together with the wide price range
of bids received, justify its conclusion that the requirements
were not clearly stated in the IFB.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed ASBCA cases and Comptroller
General decisions from 1985 to present relevant to food
service contracts and solicitations. A trend analysis was
conducted in both areas to determine the most frequent reasons
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for the two respective litigative actions. The following
summarizes the analysis of claims and protests submitted to
these judicial bodies:
a. The primary reason for a claim submitted to the ASBC was
that in the contractor's opinion, services were being
provided outside the scope of the requirements listed in
the PWS. This reason translates into the primary post-
award difficulty encountered in performance and
administration of food service contracts based upon
submission of claims to the ASBCA.
b. The most frequent pre-award cause of performing work
outside the scope of the contract requirements found in
the analysis of the ASBCA cases was that specifications
in the PWS were either deficient or ambiguous.
c. The findings of the analysis of protest actions to the
Comptroller General identified that the primary reason
for a submission of a protest was that a solicitation
had been amended a multitude of times and caused
confusion for both parties, the Government and the
contractor.
d. The results of the Comptroller General protest and ASBCA
analysis' support one another in the pre-award problem
of deficient and ambiguous specifications, and multiple
amendments to a solicitation are interrelated. The
inability to accurately identify, and subsequently
describe the agencies requirements in a solicitation
will cause deficient, and ambiguous specifications
leading to multiple amendments to the solicitation, or
post-award problems.
e. An adversarial relationship between the Government and
the contractor may develop because the COTR/QAE conduct
contract administration functions, specifically,
inspection procedures, in a manner not in accordance
with contract requirements. This can result from




Improper deductions from contractor payments may occur
as the result of improper inspection procedures being
performed which are not in compliance with the language
of the contract. This can be caused by ambiguous
contract language, and/or improper training and follow-
up of the COTR/QAE who conducts the inspections.
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The next chapter will be an analysis of the General
Accounting Office, Army Audit Agency, and Naval Audit Service
findings and recommendations pertaining to audits conducted
for food service contracts.
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IV. AUDITS OF FOOD SERVICE CONTRACTS
This chapter summarizes the reports by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) , Army Audit Agency, and the Naval
Audit Service from 1980 to present. A list of the audits
reviewed is contained in Appendix C.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold: (1) to identify
the most frequent contract administration problems found by
the auditors; (2) to identify the most frequent pre-award
causes of contract administration problems found by the
auditors; and (3) to identify the auditors recommended
corrective actions.
A. REPORTS BY THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The GAO conducted an audit of the Department of Defense
(DOD) food service program during 1981. This has been the
only report provided by the GAO specifically addressing food
service contracting. Although, this report was submitted in
the early 1980's, the reader will recognize that the problems
identified in this report are the same problems currently
being experienced in food service contracting.
The GAO found that the major problem in contract
administration was that the methods for inspecting and
measuring contractor performance are of limited effectiveness.
The specific areas found were: (1) food service contracts do
not contain specific, measurable standards, tolerances
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allowed, and deduction rates for unacceptable performance; (2)
inspection methods and the criteria used were inadequate; (3)
inspection frequencies varied and inspections were inade-
quately documented; and (4) inspectors were inadequately
trained in contract administration. As a result of the
deficient inspection and monitoring procedures, the GAO
concluded that the DOD was left with the options of accepting
marginal or unacceptable performance, performing some of the
work with military personnel, or terminating the contract.
The GAO addressed the inspection environment the contractor
was operating within as follows: [Ref. 17 :p. 25]
Food service contracts described the functions the
contractor was to perform and provided detailed instruc-
tions of the functions to be performed. Performance
standards were often stated in general terms. As a
result, assessing performance was largely a matter of
judgement.
In addition to a lack of measurable criteria for assessing
a contractor's performance, the GAO found that contract
provisions and methods for performing inspections of dining
facilities were inadequate. Inspections were found to be
primarily consisting of completing checklists and logs
containing inadequate criteria for determining unacceptable
performance. Therefore, the inspection results were
judgmental in nature and had limited effectiveness. The
following is an example that the GAO report cited as being
representative of the type of inspection they found being
conducted: [Ref. 17 :p. 31]
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July 2, 1979 inspection July 11, 1979 inspection
Rating: Unsatisfactory Rating: Satisfactory
Findings: Findings:
Door dirty Door dirty
Dirty carts One dirty cart
Dirty dishes in sink Gear adrift in sink
Deck needs scrubbing Deck and bulkheads need
scrubbing
Space not properly Improperly opened closet







Food service officials could not explain these apparently
inconsistent ratings.
During their visits to military installations the GAO
auditors found that personnel assigned to inspect contractors'
performance were food service officials or personnel with
extensive experience and training in food services. However,
their discussions with the officials disclosed that the
monitors generally had little or no experience and training in
contracts and contract administration. In many instances the
monitors were not familiar with the contract provisions.
In its report to the Secretary of Defense, the GAO also
identified two major problem areas in the pre-award phase of
food service contracting: (1) estimating requirements; and
(2) evaluating contractor capabilities. The GAO comments on
these two areas as follows: [Ref. 17 :p. 36]
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In many instances, Government estimates of meals on which
contractor bids and proposals were submitted, were
inaccurate and Government performance evaluations were
inadequate. As a result, contractors may have submitted
unrealistic bids and proposals. Also, in the absence of
effective evaluations, the Government had little assurance
that contractors could meet performance requirements.
In its visits to military installations, the GAO found
many monthly estimates of the number of meals used for the
requirements of the contracts varied significantly from the
actual number of meals served by contractors. The GAO
recognized the significance of determining accurate estimates
of meal requirements: [Ref. 17 :p. 36]
Since contractor bids are based in part on the estimated
meals to be served, meal estimates need to be as realistic
as possible or obviously contractors will not be able to
submit responsible bids and proposals.
The second major deficiency the GAO found in the pre-award
phase was that evaluation of bidder's ability to perform
contract requirements was inadequate. This problem was
identified by the GAO in the following finding: [Ref. 17 :p.
37]
Several food service contracts were awarded based on
inadequate pre-award surveys to determine the contractor's
ability to perform the required services. Navy contract-
ing officers generally accepted the lowest bid without a
detailed evaluation of the contractor's proposed staffing
plan for performing the contract. In addition, Army,
Navy, and Air Force determination of contractors'
abilities to meet contract requirements were generally
based on verbal input from other installations. As a
result, contracts were awarded to some contractors that
could not meet contract requirements.
The GAO determined that a major pre-award cause of
contract failure was the inadequate source selection and
evaluation process being used for food service contracts. The
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GAO expressed in the report that a proper pre-award survey is
vital to the selection and subsequent performance of a
contractor.
Although, the GAO found that a major contract administra-
tion problem was that Government inspection personnel were not
adequately trained in contracts, and contract administration,
this area could also be identified as a pre-award phase
problem. Training of Government quality assurance personnel
should begin prior to award and administration of the
contract.
As a result of their study, the GAO made the following
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: [Ref. 17: pp. 7-
8]
To improve management control of food service contracting,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take appropri-
ate actions that will:
Require that DOD's current efforts in developing and
testing of improved food service contract methods
provide:
1. uniform statements of work for full food service
dining facility attendant, and food preparation;
2. common units of measure (preferably the meal);
3. uniform meal adjustment formulas;
4. measurable performance standards;
5. inspection provisions requiring adequate documenta-
tion; and
6. equitable deduction rates for unacceptable contrac-
tor performance.
Provide for retaining adequately documented inspection
records supporting contract payments long enough to
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enable contract administrators and auditors to verify
that the Government received the services paid for.
Reemphasize the need to consider recent past experience
as well as anticipated major personnel changes in
preparing the estimates of the number of meals to
minimize unrealistic contract bids and proposals,
unprogrammed cost increases, and contractor claims and
disputes.
Remind contracting officers that comprehensive pre-award
surveys of potential food service contractors should be
made in sufficient detail to reveal potential problem
areas and to identify marginal or unsatisfactory past
contractor performance.
B. REPORTS BY THE ARMY AUDIT AGENCY
Thirteen Army Audit Agency reports relative to food
service contracts from 1980 to present were reviewed. The
purpose of this review as well as the forthcoming Naval Audit
Service Review, was to determine the most frequent contract
administration problems; identify the most frequent pre-award
causes of contract administration problems; and determine the
most frequent recommended corrective actions by the audit
officials.
1. Contract Administration Problems
In ten of the 13 audits reviewed the auditors
identified that improper inspection procedures used by quality
assurance personnel were used, resulting in improper deduc-
tions from contractor payments. The improper inspection
procedures were identified as being the result of the quality
assurance personnel not following the contract requirements,
and/or the contract language was ambiguous.
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Two other contract administration problems frequently
identified by the auditors were: (1) The quality assurance
personnel were not acting within the requirements of the
contract, because they were not properly supervised by the
contracting officer; and (2) improper and inadequate
surveillance of the contractor's performance. Both of these
problem areas were identified in seven of the 13 audit
reports
.
2. Pre-award Causes of Contract Administration Problems
The auditors identified two major pre-award causes of
the contract administration problems: (1) the quality
assurance personnel were not properly trained in contract
administration; and (2) the contract contained inadequate and
ambiguous language.
The quality assurance personnel were food service
specialists; however, the auditors found that they were not
trained in contract administration or in the requirements of
the contract. The auditors found that the contracting
officers were negligent in their duties regarding the training
of their representatives. In addition to the lack of
training, the auditors found that certain clauses of the
contract, particularly inspection clauses, contained
inadequate or ambiguous language.
3. Auditor Recommended Corrective Actions
The two corrective actions most frequently given by
the auditors were: (1) the contracting officer properly train
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and supervise quality assurance personnel; and (2) the
Government must properly identify their requirements in the
solicitation and avoid ambiguous language.
The following is a summary of an Army Audit Agency
report which is indicative of the frequent contract
administration problems, pre-award causes of these problems,
and recommended actions that have been made by the auditors.
This audit was conducted at Fort Lee, Virginia from May 1987
through July 1988. [Ref. 18]
BacXqround
On 1 January 1987, a firm fixed-price contract valued
at about $6.8 million was awarded to provide dining facility
services at Fort Lee. According to the contract requirements,
services were to be provided at 11 Government-owned,
contractor-operated dining facilities (nine full food service
and two dining facility attendant facilities) . Services
provided by the contractor for the full food service
facilities included food preparation and serving; equipment
and facility maintenance; cleaning and sanitation; and records
administration. For the dining facility attendant facilities
the contractor provided only cleaning and sanitation services,
with the remaining services provided by military personnel.
A contracting officer's representative and three
inspectors were assigned to monitor services performed by the
contractor. Contractor surveillance responsibilities were
assigned primarily to the inspectors. Basic duties of the
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inspectors included performing onsite inspections of
contractor performance, documenting inspection results, and
reporting deficiencies to the contracting officer's
representative, who in turn was responsible for insuring that
services performed and billed conformed to the terms of the
contract.
Contract Administration Problems
- Contracted food service work was not adequately monitored
to ensure that all food services specified by the
contract were performed.
The contracting officer's representative (COR) had not
established standard inspection procedures nor instructed the
inspectors on required inspection techniques. Also, the
contractor did not submit a complete or accurate schedule of
planned work. As a result, the contractor did not accomplish
some services specified in the contract. Overpayment for
services that were not accomplished by the contractor could
not be quantified due to inadequate inspection procedures.
The contracting officer's representative provided little
or no guidance to the inspectors for determining what,
when, and how often to inspect facilities.
As a result of no guidance, inspectors examined food
service tasks on an item-by-item basis in each dining
facility. For example, to evaluate contractor performance in
cleaning dining tables, inspectors inspected all tables within
a facility. In essence, inspectors attempted to inspect 100
percent of the contractor's work. Because of time
constraints, this method of inspection limited the number of
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services and facilities that could be inspected. As a result,
inspectors were not able to regularly monitor contractor
performance.
- Neither the contracting officer's representative nor the
inspectors prepared detailed inspection reports to show
that services rendered by contractors were performed
satisfactorily
.
Although, three types of inspection reports were
developed and used, they were of little use for documenting
contractor performance. For example, a quality assurance
checklist was used for inspecting cleaning services; however,
the checklist did not include many of the required services
and the frequency that services should be performed. Detailed
inspection reports are essential, otherwise the ability to
reduce contractor payments for nonperformance is limited.
Results of inspections were not reported to the
contracting officer.
Although the inspection method used by surveillance
personnel was not adequate to evaluate overall contractor
performance, numerous recurring deficiencies were identified
and documented during the inspections. No deductions were
made from the contractor payments, however, because inspection
reports indicating poor performance were not forwarded to the
contracting officer. Consequently, the contractor had little
incentive to correct the deficiencies and to insure that the
same deficiencies did not recur.
Surveillance of the contractor's performance was not
sufficiently performed.
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The contracting officer's representative did not
enforce contract provisions and require the contractor to
maintain an effective quality control program. Contract
provisions required the food service contractor to implement
an effective quality control program to insure compliance with
contract requirements. The contracting officer's represen-
tative, however, did not enforce contract provisions and did
not obtain and evaluate the contractor's quality control
program and inspection records.
Pre-award Causes of Contract Administration Problems
The contractor did not submit an updated work schedule
before start of the contract.
Contract provisions required the contractor to provide a
schedule of planned work for each dining facility, showing the
day and times of each day that each cleaning service would be
performed. The contractor did not submit this schedule prior
to starting contract performance.
Contract requirements for the food service contract were
not based on minimum needs.
Contract requirements were based on the maximum number
of meals that each of the 11 dining facilities were designed
to serve in a 90 minute period. As a result, the food service
contractor was paid for services that were not required and
were not performed.
- The contracting officer's representative and the
inspectors were not properly trained prior to contract
execution.
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The improper inspection and sampling techniques
occurred as a result of these individuals not receiving the
appropriate training prior to contract award on inspection and
sampling techniques.
Auditor Reco"""*^**-^™"
Determine the Government estimate for meals for the 1988
contract based upon actual historical head counts vice
maximum number of meals that each dining facility was
designed to serve.
Require the food service contractor to provide detailed
work schedules to show planned performance of work
including locations, dates and times cleaning services
will be performed.
Strengthen inspection procedures over the contract by
implementing a formal contract surveillance program.
Train the contracting officer's representative and
inspectors in statistical sampling techniques to perform
their assigned duties.
- Require the contracting officer's representative to
insure that the contractor implements an effective
quality control system. On a recurring basis, review and
document the adequacy of the contractors inspection
records.
C. REPORTS BY THE NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE
Six audits by the Naval Audit Service relative to food
service contracts were reviewed. The following is the
identification of contract administration problems, pre-award
causes of these problems, and recommended corrective actions
given by the auditors.
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1. Contract Administration Problems
The three common problems identified by the Naval
Audit Service were; (1) improper surveillance of the
contractor's performance; (2) inadequate inspections being
conducted; (3) improper accountability of Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE)
.
As was noted by the GAO in its report to the Secretary
of Defense, the Navy prefers to conduct unannounced inspec-
tions of the contractors performance. [Ref. 17 :p. 32] The
auditors noted in four of the six audits reviewed that
unannounced inspections were either not being made, or being
made inadequately. Inadequate surveillance of the contractors
performance was identified by the auditors in five of the six
audits. Included within this finding was the routine certifi-
cation of contractor payment without adequate evaluation of
performance. Additionally, the auditors found in three audits
that GFE was being utilized by the contractor which was not
properly accounted for by both parties.
2. Pre-award Causes of Contract Administration Problems
The auditors identified the primary pre-award cause of
the contract administration problems was that the contracting
officer's technical representative (COTR) was not properly
trained in his duties. Additionally, in one report the COTR
was not designated in writing, and his duties were not
outlined.
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3. Auditors Recommended Corrective Actions
There were two common recommendations given by the
Naval Audit Service auditors: (1) Implement and conduct a
COTR training course; and (2) installations conduct their own
local periodic audits of the enlisted dining facilities. The
auditors two primary areas to focus on were training and
periodic reviews to evaluate the results of the training.
The following is a summary of the findings of an audit
conducted at the Naval Technical Training Center, Corry
Station, Pensacola, Florida, which is indicative of the
results of the audits reviewed. [Ref. 19: pp. 12-15]
Auditor Findings
The following are the findings that were discovered
during the audit by the Naval Audit Service:
- Invoices for contract messing services are being
routinely certified for payment although contractor
performance is not being reviewed. Therefore, there is
no assurance that services are commensurate with payments
made.
- Unannounced inspections of food service operations to
determine performance ratings are not being made. The
contract specified that such inspections will be made
using a Food Service Ratings Sheet.
Military personnel were performing duties for which the
contractor is being paid. Military personnel were
observed, who were untrained in food sanitation, and
without a medical screening, preparing and cooking food.
The scope of work was increased in the contract by over
6,800 labor hours, an increase of 11 percent. this
increase in scope was the result of a possible increase
of 600 students due to closure of another activity.
However, this possible increase was based upon a
contingency which was unlikely to occur. Since the
contract is firm fixed price, the contractor will be
compensated for services not performed.
68
The above summary was provided to illustrate the
common problems associated with contract administration that
were discovered in the review of the audits conducted by the
Naval Audit Service.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed reports by the GAO, the Army
Audit Agency, and the Naval Audit Service. The following
summarizes the conclusions of the Government Auditors
identified in this analysis of audit reports:
1. Contract Administration Problems
a. Food service contracts do not contain specific,
measurable standards, tolerances allowed, and deduction
rates for unacceptable performance which precludes
proper surveillance of contractors performance.
b. Inspection methods and criteria used are inadequate
resulting in improper deductions from contractor
payments, or over payment to the contractor.
c. Inspection frequencies varied and inspections were
inadequately documented and reported to the contracting
officer.
d. Quality assurance personnel not acting within the
parameters of the contract requirements.
e. Improper accountability of GFE.
2. Pre-award Causes of Contract Administration Problems
a. In many instances, Government estimates of its
requirement used in the solicitation were inaccurate,
which resulted in the contractor submitting unrealistic
bids and proposals.
b. The evaluation of an offeror's ability to perform the
contract requirements was inadequate. The result of
inadequate source selection and evaluation is a major
cause of contract failure.
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c. Quality assurance personnel were not properly trained in
contract administration , and the requirements of the
contract.
d. The solicitation and the resulting contract contained
ambiguous and inadequate language.
3. Recommended Corrective Action
a. Utilize uniform statements of work for full food
service, dining facility attendant, and food
preparation.
b. Use common units of measure (preferably the meal) to
determine contract requirements and to price the
contract.
c. Use uniform meal adjustment formulas to facilitate
contract pricing when the required meal count
fluctuates.
d. Ensure that measurable performance standards are
included in the contract to facilitate surveillance.




Ensure the deduction rates for unacceptable performance
are equitable.
g. Provide for retaining adequate documented inspection
methods to support contractor payments.
h. Base contract requirements on historical data as well as
anticipated major changes in personnel for the meal
estimate to minimize unrealistic bids and proposals.
i. Emphasize the use of comprehensive pre-award surveys of
potential food service contractors to prevent possible
non-performance of the contract.
j . The contracting officer must properly train and
supervise the quality assurance personnel (i.e., COTR's,
COR'S, and QAE's)
k. Avoid ambiguous language that leads to subjective
conclusions on the part of the quality assurance
personnel
.
1. Installations should conduct local periodic audits of
their dining facilities.
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The next chapter presents the results of a random mail
survey sent to contracting offices and civilian food service
contractors. This chapter addressed the views of Government
auditors in the areas of contract administration problems,
pre-award causes of the problems, and recommendations. The
next chapter will present the views of those actively
involved, on a day-to-day basis with food service contracts,




The data presented in this study were gathered through a
random mail survey sent to 78 contracting officers from the
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, and 80 civilian contractors. Of
the 78 mail surveys sent to contracting officers, 24 were sent
back that properly answered the questions, nine were returned
stating that their contracting office has not awarded a food
service contract, and the remaining 4 5 surveys were not
responded to. Of the 80 mail surveys sent to civilian food
service contractors, eighteen were returned that properly
answered the questions, twelve were returned stating that they
have never been awarded a food service contract through the
Government, and the remaining 50 were not responded to.
In the analysis of the mail survey results, all numbers
and percentages will be based on only those mail survey
questionnaires that were sent back properly answering the
questions. These totals as stated above are 24 Government,
and 18 civilian food service contractor.
The Government survey consisted of nine questions, and the
civilian contractor survey consisted of seven questions. Most
of the questions asked in both surveys were similar; there-
fore, the format of this chapter has been structured by
listing the question first, then listing the Government
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response, followed by the civilian contractor response. If
any question is unique to either entity, it will be noted as
such.
This survey was not intended to be a statistically
significant sampling of responses, but rather a collection of
opinions from the experts in the field of food service
contracting on what the difficulties are in the post-award and
pre-award phases, and what actions have been or could be taken
to prevent these difficulties.
B. THE RESPONSES
1. Question One





Cost Plus Award Fee: 8%
Fixed-Price Incentive Firm: 4%
Fixed-Price Award Fee: 4%
b. Contractor Responses
Firm Fixed-Price: 89%
Fixed-Price Award Fee: 11%
This response provided a basic idea of what types of
contracts are being awarded for food service contracts.
2 . Question Two








This response provided an idea of the most common
procurement method being used. The responses indicate that
competitive procurement is most common, however, the use of
the sealed bid method is also being used in a lot of
instances.
3. Question Three (Government only):
What types of incentives are you presently using in
your food service contracts?
Government Responses
Negative incentives only: 83%
Positive incentives only: 0%
Both Positive and Negative: 17%
The clear majority of the respondents are utilizing
negative incentives only, which are in the form of deductions
as a result of inspections procedures. However, five of the
negative incentive only respondents stated that upon comple-
tion of the current contract, both positive and negative
incentives will be implemented into the new contract action.
The respondents that are utilizing both positive and
negative incentives are using deductions as the result of
substandard inspection results, along with an award fee for
performance above the minimal required level. The award fee
is decided upon by an award fee board, and is used in




In your opinion, what are the major difficulties
associated with administration (Government) or
performance (contractor) of food service contracts?
a. Government Responses
The biggest difficulty identified by the Govern-
ment respondents was that as a result of the continuous
changes in the meal requirement, the contractor is constantly
performing work outside the scope of the contract require-
ments. Sixty-three percent of those responding to the survey
listed this as the largest contract administration problem.
Additionally, they felt that this was the result of the
inability to accurately determine requirements due to the
continuous changes in the meal requirements.
Others addressed the difficulty of insuring
Quality Assurance personnel (i.e., COTR's, QAE's) follow
appropriate guidelines, and that they do not make unauthorized
changes to the contract. Some typical comments received are
paraphrased below:
Food service contracts are "attention getters" as they
affect the morale of those being fed. Also, there are
perceptions that a problem exists when actually perfor-
mance received is in accordance with the contract. This
perception develops when the Government expects more than
what is required by the contract. Government requests to
perform services outside those defined in the contract
also create problems. Termination situations are
extremely difficult as there is rarely a contingency plan
to cover the absence of contracted food service.
Government does not adhere to the statement of work.
The lack of communication and knowledge of contracting as
it pertains to the relationship between the contract
administrator and the agency that requires the services.
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Evaluation plan(s) not set forth in the contract in
sufficient detail to permit accurate surveillance.
Added inspection required due to contractors efforts to
maintain costs within the Firm Fixed-Price Contract.
Insuring QA personnel follow appropriate guidelines, and
are familiar with procurement procedures.
Keeping everyone from making unauthorized changes to the
contract.
Delays in effecting changes (i.e., from COTR to NRCC, to
vendor, back to NRCC, to COTR for reasonableness evalua-
tion back to NRCC for final modification)
.
8(a) contractors declaring bankruptcy.
The Government and the contractor have had continuing
disagreements as to the acceptable manning level caused by
not including an estimated manning chart in the solicita-
tion.
Keeping contract current as to the changing requirements
for opening and closing dining facilities due to changes
in troop strength and budget cuts.
Doing quality assurance on the quality of food preparation
at all times—not only when inspector is present.
Making military managers cognizant of their limitations in
dealing with the contractor, and insuring accurate penalty
deductions for non performance.
Competition is so close that contractors usually cannot
afford to perform well. This requires constant vigilance
on the part of the COTR.
b. Contractors Responses
The civilian contractors identified two major
difficulties in performance of their food service contracts.
Fifty percent identified performing work outside the require-
ments listed in the contract as one of the biggest difficul-
ties. Forty-four percent of the respondents listed that an
adversarial relationship between employees and the Government
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Quality Assurance personnel as one of the major difficulties.
Presented below are some paraphrased comments in response to
this question:
Lack of flexibility. Innovation discouraged. Low bid
mentality precludes quality programs. Contracting for
specific areas of operations reduces ability for overall
operation planning.
Unqualified Contracting Officers Representatives display
bitterness towards all contractors (as if the contractors
took their jobs)
.
Areas of concern and most important are the different
interpretations of the statement of work (SOW) , frequent
replacement of COTR's, and the SOW requiring satisfactory
performance while customer and COTR's expect excellent
performance.
Indefinite quantities and changing requirements, and
inaccurate projections of the meals to be served. Con-
flicts with military personnel.
Firm fixed-price contract eliminates the profit incentive
private enterprises operate under.
The Government tells the contractors "how" to perform the
contract requirements instead of "what" the requirements
are.
When quality inspectors change so does the interpretation
of the provisions of the Performance Requirements Summary
(PRS) .
Government allows contractor very little time to start-up
the contract from date of award (ie one to two weeks)
.
Bad attitude toward contractor by QA personnel.
Unrealistic Government inspection techniques and evalua-
tion.
Being requested or directed by Government officials to
perform tasks not specifically addressed in contract
requirements.
Unrealistic requirements that are asked, but not iden-
tified in the contract.
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Performing work outside contract requirements because the
PWS is ambiguous and open for many interpretations.
Quality Assurance Evaluators (QAE's) expecting Rolls Royce
service for Pinto prices (i.e., QAE's timing the time from
when a patron gets up, and writes up the contractor if
plates are not picked-up "exactly" within the time
specified—which is two minutes. If my pick-up time is
two minutes, ten seconds I get written up for a deduc-
tion) .
Lack of experience of COTR's and QAE's in dealing with
civilian contractors.
5. Question Five
In your opinion, what difficulties in the performance
of your food service contract can be attributed to
pre-award actions by the Government or your company?
a. Government Responses
The primary reason why 67% of the Government
respondents believed that post-award difficulties were caused
was because the Government drafted ambiguous or inadequate
specifications for the PWS as a result of not being able to
properly identify the requirement. Responses of the
Government officials are as follows:
Many food service contract difficulties can be eliminated
or minimized during pre-award phase. Careful review of
staffing proposals, cost proposals, and key personnel will
eliminate firms trying to "buy-in" to a food service
contract.
Contracting personnel need to analyze recommendations from
other agencies carefully. A recent pre-award survey by
DCAMO, recommended full award on the exercise of an
option, after applying the established criteria for pre-
award surveys on financial capability. After further
investigation, we learned the company has large debts and
that the exercise of the option under this contract would
result in bankruptcy proceedings for this small business.
Failure of the contracting officer to communicate those
issues or specifications in the contract with the agent or
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user. The contracting officer oftentimes makes decisions
to meet deadlines which result in contract modifications.
The quality assurance evaluation plan developed was not
workable, resulting in deductions that were inadequate,
and claims were received.
Failure to identify accurate requirements. Unrealistic
assessment or no assessment of manning levels.
Inadequate and ambiguous specifications caused by
inaccurate historical data and incomplete inventory lists.
Evaluations on technical proposals are merely acceptable
or unacceptable. We cannot rate technical proposals in
order of desirability. We thus end up with the low
bidder, when another company may have offered a more cost
effective proposal.
A lack of adequate workload data during pre-award phase to
insure an accurate assessment of the contract require-
ments. This often means the contractor based his price on
erroneous information, which leads to poor performance in
an attempt to recoup costs.
The PWS limits the flexibility of the contractor.
Buy-ins or unrealistic bidding for food service contracts
is required in order to win the award. Once the contrac-
tor wins, he must find ways to recover from his unrealis-
tic low bid. The bidders consistently underestimate the
amount of personnel needed to meet the requirements of the
PWS.
Ambiguities in the PWS, inaccurate technical exhibits and
overstating contractor personnel qualification require-
ments .
PWS not being clear on what is required.
Unusable Quality Assurance Plans along with a lack of
positive incentives to improve performance beyond minimum
levels.
We do not have a clear understanding of the requirements.
b. Contractor Responses
Seventy-two percent of the contractors felt that
difficulties in contract performance were caused by submitting
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bids and proposals in response to ambiguous and deficient
solicitations, which did not adequately identify the require-
ments for the food service. Additional comments are para-
phrased below:
Contracting officers are not available for meetings or
discussions of needs. The Government has a lack of under-
standing of food service management.
The Government allows contractors to buy-in as a result of
sealed bids.
COTR's are not properly educated and trained.
Government does not provide any idea of the minimum staff-
ing requirement.
The Government drags out small details for days or weeks
prior to officially notifying you of the award, sometimes
leaving you with very little start-up time. I have
started several contracts with less than 10 working days
notice and I always had poor cooperation from the
Government
.
Future actions of the Government that are known and will
affect my performance of the contract are not mentioned or
discussed during pre-award phase.
Government does not adequately check the low bidder during
sealed bid to verify if his low price can perform the job.
Certain questions are sometimes not asked by my company
and the Government wants to modify the contract as soon as
it is awarded.
6. Question Six
What actions have you taken to resolve post-award
problems associated with food service contracts?
a. Government Responses
Fifty-four percent of the respondents identified
the action taken to be implementing a training program for the
COTR and the relevant contractor personnel. Additionally,
thirty-eight percent stated that the action taken to resolve
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their post-award difficulties was to modify the contract to
reflect the actual requirements. Responses are paraphrased
below:
Actions taken on post-award problems include: Providing
additional training to COTR and contractor, the loan of
Government furnished equipment, forbearance of deductions.
Initiated contract modifications to meet specifications
that appeared ambiguous or otherwise debated.
Added incentives (award fee) to new contract to incen-
tivize contractor.
Conduct periodical meetings with contractor to facilitate
understanding of contract.
Correct specification error by modifying contract.
I, as a contracting officer have provided training to food
service personnel and Government inspectors so that they
understand their role. I have been very proactive in
contract administration.
Negotiated arrangements to correct deficiencies in
requirement determination.
Conduct Government/contractor workshops and conduct onsite
assistance visits as a contracting officer.
Several modifications have been issued to clarify or add
definitive requirements to the services required.
Implemented mandatory COTR and contractor weekly meetings.
Emphasize mutual expectations during weekly meetings and
use award fee to incentivize.
Changed the type of contract being used from Firm Fixed-
Price to Fixed-Price Award Fee to incentivize contractor.
Sent cure notices to contractor.
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b. Contractor Responses
The contractors had varied actions that were taken
to resolve post-award difficulties. Typical comments are
paraphrased below:
Continue to meet demands of the inspecting officers
regardless of benefit to operation.
Conduct constant regular training of personnel in food
preparation and sanitation.
Employ personnel that are qualified and loyal to their
operations.
Work closely with the COTR. State problem with a recom-
mended solution.
Perform under all circumstances, then address problem at
a later time.
Constantly negotiate with the Government in order to
arrive at a decision.
Regulate our shifts to accommodate the number of meals
served.
Conduct extensive training of supervisor.
Enforce open communication with COTR.
Seek to clearly define terms and conditions of ambiguous
wording in contract during pre-award phase.
I have tried to resolve differences through using the
contracting officer. In many cases this action has been
to no avail, and I have wasted many man hours and have had
to resort to submitting claims.
Constant open communications with COTR to get feedback on
how we are doing and what needs to be changed.
Generally, we are able to solve problems simply by meeting
with the contracting officer and his staff.
I insure good communication. If both parties are willing
to bend, problems can be resolved.
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7. Question Seven (Government only)
What degree of success has been achieved by your






Seventy-one percent of the respondents believed that
the actions they have taken were at least somewhat successful
in correcting post-award difficulties. However, 29% of the
respondents either had not experienced any success or did not
want to respond to this question. This was probably because
there was not a significant improvement in performance as the
result of actions taken to correct a difficulty. Typical
responses are paraphrased below:
Performance has improved somewhat but not sufficiently to
meet the minimum requirements of the contract. The
company president had advised me that he cannot afford to
cure poor performance because of cash flow difficulties.
By insuring the COTR's are properly informed of what the
contract states has decreased the number of unauthorized
commitments made by this agency and subsequent claims
submitted by the contractor.
By basing profit on an incentive basis has improved con-
tractor performance.
Negotiating fixed labor rate for additional services has
expedited negotiating of post-award modifications for
additional effort.
Meeting with the contractor and insuring he understands
the contract requirements has led to superior performance
by allowing the contractor to be able to plan opening,
closing, and staffing in advance.
All of my negative actions taken (i.e., pressure at all
points in the process) have had minimal success.
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Generally, the contractor has provided a "quick fix"
solution to the problem (s) , which normally erodes in a
short period of time.
Insuring COTR and contractor have weekly meetings to
identify potential problems has had excellent results.
The major success has occurred as a result of positive
incentives (ie award fee, praise, etc.).
Insuring frequent interaction between contracting officer,
COTR, and contractor has reduced problems. If interaction
stops, the contractor will cut corners.
8. Question Eight
In your opinion, what actions can the Government take
prior to contract award that would improve the perfor-
mance of food service contracts?
a. Government Responses
Forty-two percent of the respondents believed that
the Government must take more actions to insure that the PWS
is accurate and non-ambiguous. Another popular response was
that competitive procurement instead of sealed bidding should
be the primary acquisition method for food service contracts.
These respondents felt that discussions/negotiations are
necessary to insure that all ambiguities are worked out prior
to contract award. Typical comments are paraphrased below:
Contingency planning for failed contracts.
A panel review of the proposed statement of work. Panel
should consist of those parties that interface with food
service contractor performance.
The solicitation should require a technical proposal
containing at a minimum: staffing plans, resumes for key
personnel, strike contingency plans, and corporate
experience.
Training for quality assurance evaluators and COTR's in
contracting procedures and relationships are important to
contract performance.
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Insure PWS is proper and reflects the needs of the
Government and equipment listing is accurate.
Contracting officer must meet with the user of the
services and review the PWS for clarity.
The Government must clearly define their requirements.
There must be a sit down meeting between the COTR,
contracting officer, and contractor to discuss all aspects
of the contract. The Government and contractor must
clearly understand the contract requirements prior to
awarding the contract.
Have people, other than those who prepared the PWS, review
the solicitation for accuracy and completeness.
Use Request for Proposal rather than Invitation for Bid.
This permits evaluations of offers including a technical
proposal to insure award is made to the most reliable and
favorable offeror based upon evaluation criteria. This
permits a Total Quality Management (TQM) award.
The Government should devise a uniform method of source
selection which considers quality, staffing, past




As with the Government responses, the two most
popular opinions on the part of the civilian contractors were:
(1) the Government needs to more properly identify its
requirements in the PWS to avoid ambiguities and confusion,
and (2) negotiations/discussions are needed to insure all
parties fully understand the contract requirements. There-
fore, competitive procurement instead of sealed bidding, in
the respondents opinion, is the preferred method of acquisi-
tion for food service contracts. Typical comments are para-
phrased below:
Make all food service contracts negotiated rather than
sealed bid.
85
State requirements concisely rather than amending the
solicitation eight to ten times before award.
Develop a solicitation which allows private enterprise to
maximize their entrepreneurial spirit.
Using negotiations/discussions to insure all persons
involved in the contract understand exactly what the
contract requirements are,. and that each person
understands their responsibilities.
Write specifications that are straight forward instead of
so ambiguous that they can be interpreted in any way a
person wishes.
Thoroughly evaluate the proposed contractor's ability to
provide the kind of service the contract calls for.
Insure contractors are technically qualified, not just low
price.
Government needs to understand their own requirements and
use discussions to negotiate a fair and equitable price
for both the Government and contractor.
All food service contracts should be negotiated so the
Government knows exactly what the contractor is offering.
A technical proposal including manning charts, quality
control plan, and a cost proposal should be mandatory.
9. Question Nine
Do you have any free form comments relative to food
service contracting?
a. Government Responses
This question provoked a myriad of responses,
which was the intended purpose. This question was utilized to
uncover any opinions from the experts in the field that were
not brought out by the primary questions in the mail survey.
The popular response was that a formal training school should
be developed for the Government Quality Assurance Evaluators
(QAE's) . All COTR's and QAE's should be required to attend
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this formal training prior to administering a food service
contract. Other comments received are paraphrased below:
Recommend the use of a fixed-price award fee contract on
a trial basis for food services. This type of contract
would offer contractors an incentive to perform above the
minimum required level. The award fee could be admin-
istered by a board of those affected at the base level.
A fee determination recommended by the board could be made
by the base commanding officer. Award fees are not
subject to appeal. The benefit derived by the Government
in obtaining services that exceed the minimum needs of the
Government must also be examined.
Contractors must possess good management skills to enable
the supervisor to accomplish staffing of the dining facil-
ities.
Vendors should be competing on other factors than price
alone; therefore, technical proposals are an essential
requirement in the acquisition process. Award should be
allowed to be given to other than the low offeror.
SBA set aside contracts are necessary for affirmative
action to enhance small disadvantaged business; however,
they cost much more and force many commands out of the
contracting arena due to funding constraints.
b. Contractor Responses
Again, a full spectrum of responses were received:
some contractors felt that a contractor "buying-in" on a food
service contract is a common occurrence because they know that
the Government will issue contract modifications after award.
Most of the respondents believed, however, that solicitations
are being sent out by the Government which have numerous
mistakes causing amendments and confusion. This spectrum is
illustrated by the seven responses paraphrased below:
One thing I have extreme difficulty understanding is why
so many activities have been contracting food services for
15 to 20 years and still have to issue one to ten amend-
ments to each solicitation which keeps a company in limbo
for two to three months trying to identify one contract.
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In my experience, all Government agencies use prototype
solicitations. In a lot of cases, the contracting
officers are not deleting the inapplicable portions of the
PWS, and are not adding pertinent information concerning
the contracted facility.
Everyone should understand that in food service contracts
each person involved may see the results differently.
Contrary to contracts for merchandise which may be
measured and tested in reference to exact verifiable
specifications, service contracts are measured in
reference to an individual's opinion. Beauty is in the
eye of the beholder.
One of the greatest problems is with the release of a
solicitation which has not been thoroughly checked for
mistakes, omissions, and ambiguities, which generate
contractor protests. This in turn causes unnecessary
delays, wastes time, and money for both parties.
Government should evaluate all the contract requirements
to make sure they are realistic and attainable. Some
contractors may agree to anything just to get a contract,
and later discover they cannot perform.
Stop awarding contracts which are too low for a contractor
to do a good job. This would eliminate modifications to
the contract.
Sometimes the Government requires a minimum manning level
which is more than is needed. A contractor who earnestly
attempts to comply with this level will not be awarded the
contract. This means the winner often lied about the
labor hours and the Government failed to check the numbers
thoroughly. On the other hand, contracting officers often
award to the low bidder no matter how ridiculously low it
is. In some cases this contract is out for bid again in
less than a year.
C. SUMMARY OF THE DATA
This section will summarize the data presented in this
chapter, and along with the data presented in Chapters III and
IV will serve as the foundation for conclusions presented in




Pre-award causes of post-award difficulties
Actions taken to resolve post-award difficulties and
degree of success realized
What actions the Government could take prior to award to
improve the performance of the contractor
These areas are the primary subsets for this research
effort. Therefore, by understanding the difficulties associa-
ted with the pre-award and post-award phases, along with
actions taken, or actions that could be taken, conclusions and




Both the Government officials and the civilian con-
tractors identified the same two areas of difficulty: (1)
Performing work outside the scope of the contract require-
ments; and (2) Quality Assurance personnel (i.e., COTR's and
QAE's) not acting in a manner consistent with the requirements
of the contract.
Sixty-three percent of the Government officials and
50% of the contractors felt that performing services outside
the scope of the contract requirements was the largest
difficulty in post-award. Both respondents further stated
that the inability of the Government to accurately identify
the requirements was the major cause of this difficulty.
The other major difficulty addressed by both respon-
dents was the area of Quality Assurance activities. The
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Government officials addressed that they had difficulties in
insuring that COTR's and QAE's follow appropriate guidelines
during inspection, and that they do not make unauthorized
changes to the contract. The contractor respondents identi-
fied an adversarial relationship between themselves and the
Government Quality Assurance personnel as a major difficulty.
2. Pre-award causes of post-award difficulties
Again, both the Government officials and the civilian
contractors identified the same problem area. Sixty-seven
percent of the Government respondents and 72% of the contrac-
tor respondents felt that the major pre-award cause of their
post-award difficulties was that the Government drafted
ambiguous or inadequate specifications for the PWS that is
sent out in the solicitation.
Ambiguous or inadequate specifications can have a
direct impact upon performance and administration of food
service contracts. Specifically, the two major post-award
difficulties identified, performing services outside the scope
of the contract, and improper activities on the part of
Quality Assurance personnel, can be the result of ambiguous or
inadequate contract specifications. Performing services
outside the scope of the contract requirements can be the
result of failing to adequately identify the requirements of
an agency. Additionally, improper activities by Quality
Assurance personnel and an adversarial relationship with these
personnel can be caused by ambiguous contract language where
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the COTR/QAE interpret the language one way, and the
contractor interprets the language another way.
3. Actions taken to resolve post-award difficulties and
degree of success realised.
The Government respondents most frequently identified
two actions that have been taken. Fifty-four percent of the
respondents have implemented periodic training for the COTR
and relevant contractor personnel. Additionally, thirty-eight
percent of the respondents stated that the action taken was to
modify the contract to reflect the actual requirements.
The Government officials that identified that they
have taken a corrective action by instituting a training
program or modifying a contract have in most cases experienced
some degree of success. Overall, seventy-one percent of the
respondents feel they have witnessed at least a moderate
degree of success. There were, however, still 29% of the
respondents who either did not experience any success, or did
not want to respond to this question.
The action of modifying a contract to correct a post-
award difficulty is an action, that the Government in most
cases is forced to do. Modifying the contract to correct
ambiguous language or deficient specifications after award of
the contract is the only alternative other than terminating
the contract. Although this action was identified as being
one to correct a post-award difficulty, it is not considered
by this researcher as being a proactive management step, but
rather a forced reaction.
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The contractor respondents listed a myriad of actions
that have taken to resolve post-award difficulties. Although
the actions taken were varied, however, the majority were
concerned with communication and relationship with the
Government Quality Assurance personnel.
4. What actions the Government could take prior to award
to improve the performance of the contractor.
Again, both the Government respondents and the con-
tractor respondents identified the same two actions that could
be taken by the Government prior to contract award that could
improve contract performance. The two actions are: (1) the
Government needs to more properly identify its requirements in
the PWS to avoid ambiguities and confusion, and (2) use
competitive procurement instead of sealed bid as the primary
acquisition method to procure food services.
These two actions are interrelated to one another.
The second action identified by both respondents, using
competitive procurement in lieu of sealed bid, would be a
specific action the Government could take to avoid ambiguities
and confusion in the language of the contract. By using
competitive procurement, both parties are permitted to conduct
negotiations/discussions. During this dialogue, ambiguities
and deficiencies are more certain to be identified and worked
out, than if no negotiations/discussions transpired as in the
use of the sealed bid method. In fact, this same point has
been recently made by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
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It is important to mention at this point that not only
Government officials at the military installation level who
are personally involved in soliciting, awarding, and admin-
istering food service contracts feel that actions are needed
to correct ambiguities and deficiencies in specifications.
The most senior food service officials in the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps share this same opinion. These senior officials
have also taken action to correct the Government's inability
to properly identify the requirements contained in the PWS by
drafting Prototype Food Service Solicitations to be used by
contracting agencies. These prototype solicitations have been
constructed in the format of an order or directive. Although
the use of prototype solicitations appear to be a movement in
the right direction, it is of significant importance that the
installations be proactive in the use of these documents.
These prototypes should not be used as a substitute for an
installation's own planning and identification of its needs.
It was addressed by some of the contractor respondents that
some contracting officers are using prototype solicitations
and are not deleting inapplicable portions of the PWS, and are
not adding pertinent information that is unique to their
contract.
93
5. Other relevant data received from the results of the
nail surveys.
In addition to the data summarized for the four major
subsets of this research listed above, the following are other
actions that were identified by the survey respondents which
this researcher considers relevant.
- The use of a fixed-price award fee contract to facilitate
the use of a positive incentive in conjunction with the
negative incentives that are already in place (i.e.,
inspection deductions) . This type of contract will
incentivize a contractor to perform above the minimum
required level, as well as discourage substandard
performance by including inspection deductions. All
respondents who have awarded a fixed-price award fee
contract have had successful results.
The use of a technical proposal to facilitate an eval-
uation of factors other than price. These other factors
include: management, corporate experience, manning
levels, and resumes for critical positions. Basing award
on factors other than price also supports the use of
competitive procurement instead of the sealed bid method.
Both Government and contractor respondents identified
that "buy-ins" were taking place in the food service
contracting arena because of the use of the sealed bid
procurement method.
This chapter presented and summarized the data
gathered through a mail survey sent to Government officials
and civilian food service contractors. The data received as
a result of this mail survey was from the experts in the field
who are personally involved in the administration and perform-
ance of a food service contract. It was discovered that both
the Government respondents and the contractor respondents
share the same opinion in many areas.
The next chapter will present the researcher's
conclusions, recommendations, and suggested areas of
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additional research based upon the data gathered in this
research effort.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AREAS
FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
A. GENERAL
Chapter II discussed the terms, laws, procedures, and
documentation relative to food service contracting. That
chapter also identified the critical personnel involved in the
process; the necessary actions to be taken; and associated
documentation in both the pre-award and post-award phases. In
addition the chapter established a foundation of knowledge for
the reader in reviewing the subsequent chapters by identifying
potential problem areas and new policy changes occurring in
this area.
Chapter III examined ASBCA cases and protests submitted to
the Comptroller General relative to food service contracts.
A trend analysis was conducted to determine common reasons for
claims and protests. It was ascertained that there were
common post-award difficulties and pre-award causes of these
difficulties that resulted in litigative action.
Chapter IV identified the most common significant problem
areas in contract administration (post-award) and pre-award
causes of these problems in the opinion of Government
auditors. Additionally, recommended corrective actions as
given by the auditors were identified. These audits supported
the findings of Chapter III.
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In Chapter V, mail survey questions regarding the diffi-
culties associated with administration and performance of food
service contracts; pre-award causes of these difficulties;
actions taken to resolve difficulties; and recommended pre-
award actions to improve contractor performance were addressed
to both Government officials and contractors. Again, the
opinion of these experts in the field supported the findings
of Chapters III and IV.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to determine the major
difficulties associated with administration of food service
contracts in the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and how these
difficulties might be resolved. The major difficulties will
be addressed in this section, and suggested ways to resolve
these difficulties will be addressed in the recommendations
section of this chapter. The first conclusions of this study
are:
1. Upon award of the contract, or shortly thereafter,
food service contractors are being required to perform
services not identified in the contract, resulting in
a modification to the contract.
This was the overwhelming response by both Government
officials and contractors to the mail survey. Additionally,
this was the primary reason for contractors claims to the
ASBCA. When contractors are required to perform services
outside the scope of the contract requirements, the action
that must be taken is either modify, or terminate the existing
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contract. If both parties are not satisfied, then the result
could be submission of a claim, as witnessed in Chapter III.
2. Government quality assurance personnel (i.e., COTR'8,
COR' 8, QAE's) who have been assigned responsibility to
monitor contractor performance, conduct themselves,
and order contractor personnel to perform services not
within the scope of their authority or the require-
ments of the contract. This improper activity by the
Government's quality assurance personnel has resulted
in an adversarial relationship with the contractor.
This difficulty was identified in the ASBCA analysis,
concluded by Government Auditors, and addressed by both
Government and contractor mail survey respondents. Contract-
ing officers identified that one of their major concerns is
insuring that quality assurance personnel do not make
unauthorized changes to their food service contract. In most
cases, quality assurance personnel are experts in food
service, but have never been asked to conduct surveillance
over civilian contractors.
3. Quality assurance inspection procedures being used are
improper, and the results of the inspection are not
being documented and reported to the contracting
officer.
Again, the results of the ASBCA case analysis, the
findings of Government auditors, and the opinions of the
respondents to the mail survey, indicate inadequate inspection
procedures, and failure to properly document, and forward the
results as a post-award difficulty. The use of inadequate
inspection procedures can result in improper deductions from
contractor payment, while failure to document the results of
the inspection on the Quality Deficiency Report (QDR) may lead
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to paying a contractor for services that are deficient, or not
performed.
The first subsidiary question for this study concerned
the primary causes of failure or default of food service
contracts. The next two conclusions of this study are:
4. In many instances, Government estimates of require-
ments included in the solicitation were inaccurate.
As a result, contractors have submitted unrealistic
bids and proposals which the subsequent award of the
contract was based upon.
Failure to accurately estimate the requirements in the
solicitation will result in inaccurate bids and proposals and
false expectations on the part of the contractor. The outcome
may be failure or termination because the contractor cannot
meet the real requirement due to staffing or financial
constraints.
5. Inadequate pre-award surveys to determine the
contractors ability to perform the required food
service, lead to failure or termination of the
contract.
Not properly researching and evaluating the
contractors ability to perform is detrimental to successful
performance. Specifically, the financial position of a
contractor if not adequately reviewed can lead to inability to
meet payroll expenses and even bankruptcy.
The second subsidiary question of this research
concerned the pre-award causes of post-award difficulties.
The following three conclusions for this study are:
6. Inability to adequately identify the agency's food
service requirements will lead to ambiguous or
deficient specifications in the solicitation,
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resulting in amending the solicitation a multitude of
times, and modifying the contract, thus inhibiting
successful performance and administration of the
contract.
This pre-award problem will cause all of the post-
award difficulties concluded. Performing services outside the
scope of the contract requirements; improper activities of the
quality assurance personnel; an adversarial relationship with
the contractor; and improper inspection procedures can be the
direct result of ambiguous and deficient contract language.
7. Failure to properly assign, train, and educate
Government quality assurance personnel concerning
contract administration procedures and the specific
contract requirements will cause contract adminis-
tration and performance difficulties.
All areas of research conducted in this study have
identified inadequate training of quality assurance personnel
as being a primary cause of post-award difficulties.
Additionally, contractor respondents to the mail survey
addressed this as the primary cause of an adversarial
relationship with the Government.
8. The strict use of the sealed bid method of procurement
in lieu of competitive procurement (negotiations)
precludes the clarification and confirmation of
contract requirements. The absence of discussions and
negotiations will allow ambiguous and deficient
specifications in the solicitation to cause
performance outside the scope of contract require-
ments, an adversarial relationship due to different
interpretations, and improper activities on the part
of quality assurance personnel.
Sealed bidding is the primary reason that many of the
mail survey participants felt that ambiguities and confusion
in the requirements of the contract during performance
100
existed. Negotiation, vice sealed bid, gives the Government
the opportunity to insure the contractor understands all the
requirements of the contract.
Chapter V examined among other areas, the actions
taken by Government contract administration officials in an
attempt to resolve post-award problems associated with food
service contracts, and the degree of success that they have
achieved, which was the third subsidiary question of this
study. The ninth conclusion of this study is:
9. Implementing training programs for quality assurance
and contractor personnel, and modifying the contract
are the two primary actions taken by contracting
officers in attempt to resolve post-award problems.
In most cases, contracting officers have witnessed
some degree of success in the actions taken.
Although modifying the contract was identified as an
action to correct a post-award problem, this is a forced
reaction, not an action to prevent contract administration
problems from occurring.
The fourth subsidiary question for this research
concerned contractor's reactions to the difficulties
associated with performing food service contracts. The tenth
conclusion of this study is:
10. Civilian food service contractors primarily react to
contract performance difficulties in two ways.
Contractors will continue to meet the demands of the
Government, no matter what, and submit a claim at a
later date. Additionally, contractors attempt to
diminish the adversarial relationship with
Government quality assurance personnel by conducting




These two reactions by contractors were the ways they
have attempted to resolve the two major problems associated
with contract performance they identified: performance of
services outside the scope of the contract requirements and an
adversarial relationship with quality assurance personnel.
Performing all Government demands, no matter what is also the
result of a noncooperative relationship with the Government.
In addition to the above conclusions, the following
four areas of concern are presented:
Eighty-three percent of the contractors operate in an
environment with negative incentives only. There are
presently very few techniques being used to positively
motivate contractor performance.
Both Government official's and contractors have identi-
fied that "buy-ins" are taking place as the result of
awarding to low bidder, and the Governments willingness
to modify the contract to correct deficient requirements.
The requirements of the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy (OFPP) , Policy Letter 91-2, have not been
implemented into food service contracting.
Most Government agencies have not developed a contingency
plan in case of contract termination.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary research question addressed how might the
major difficulties with contract administration be resolved,
and the fifth subsidiary question addresses what actions both
Government and industry can take prior to award that could
improve the performance of food service contracts. In regards
to both of these questions the following six recommendations
are presented:
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1. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Policy
Letter 91-2, Service Contracting , should be implemen-
ted into food service contracting.
Among the requirements of the OFPP Policy Letter 91-2
are: (1) the use of "performance-based contracting;" (2)
preparing the performance work statement (PWS) in terms of
"what" is to be required rather that "how" the work is to be
accomplished; (3) use of competitive negotiations instead of
sealed bid where quality of performance above the minimum
acceptable level will enhance agency mission accomplishment;
and (4) to the maximum extent practicable, contract provisions
shall include incentive provisions to ensure that contractors
are rewarded for good performance, and quality assurance
deduction schedules to discourage unsatisfactory performance.
Using "performance-based contracting" to include a PWS
based on "what" is to be done instead of "how" the work is to
be accomplished, will interject contractor expertise and
entrepreneuralship into food service contracting, and facil-
itate a cooperative relationship in the pre-award phase.
Using competitive negotiations instead of sealed bid will give
the Government a better opportunity to insure the contractor
understands the requirements of the contract and can perform
for the price he is quoting. Additionally, ambiguous and
deficient contract language can be identified and corrected
during discussions, and the multiple amendments to the solici-
tation and modifications to the contract will be reduced.
Using competitive procurement will facilitate evaluation of
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contractors proposals for other than price related factors
such as technical capability, management capability, cost
realism, and past performance. The use of draft requests for
proposals, if time allows, will also enhance requirements
determination
.
2. The fixed-price award fee contract should be used to
provide positive incentives in contracting food
services.
A fixed-price award fee contract affords the
Government the opportunity to incentivize contractors to
perform services above the minimum required level, and at the
same time includes quality assurance deductions to discourage
unsatisfactory performance. An award fee, which is estab-
lished in the contract, is decided upon by an award fee board,
and approved by a designated official. The amount of fee
awarded, or not awarded, is not subject to appeal by the
contractor.
The fixed-price award fee has been awarded by some of
the mail survey respondents, and based upon their input, the
use of the award fee has resulted in a significant increase in
the quality of service, and morale of the contractor.
3. A contingency plan must be developed during the
acquisition planning phase in the event unexpected
contract termination occurs.
In the event of an unexpected contract termination the
installation must have a plan to replace the absent contracted
food service. Without a contingency plan, the Government is
often faced with awarding a new contract for urgent and
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compelling reasons resulting in improper requirements
determination; ambiguous contract language; and awarding the
contract to a contractor who can begin immediately, but may
not be the most qualified. An example of a contingency plan
would be to utilize the nearest reserve unit that has cooks
and bakers on active drilling status.
4. All food service quality assurance personnel (COTR's,
COR's, QAE's) should be trained prior to assuming
their duties, and receive follow-up training during
the performance of their duties.
The training provided to the quality assurance
personnel should include cooperative relationships with
civilian contractor personnel; the requirements of the
contract; the scope of authority; specific responsibilities;
and statistical sampling techniques. Training should
emphasize the avoidance of an adversarial relationship.
5. Contractor quality control personnel should attend the
same training seminars as Government quality assurance
personnel .
This is required to facilitate better communications
between industry and the Government as well as educate
contractor quality control personnel "from the same book."
This recommendation would also minimize adversarial relation-
ships and claims as a result of disagreements in judgement.
6. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps should develop and
implement a central contract management concept to
provide continuity and consistency to food service
contract- ing. A Headquarters level agency should be
designated as the functional proponent for all matters
relating to food service contracting.
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The central management agency should establish policy
and procedures to provide:
1. A performance work statement (PWS) /quality assurance
surveillance plan (QASP) team to coordinate and assist
the installations in developing functional documents to
include the PWS, QASP, Government estimate, and the
contingency plan.
2. Conduct assistance visits to installations within one
year prior to the anticipated award date of a new
contract.
3. Review and certify functional requirements (i.e., PWS
and QASP) of all food service contract solicitations.
4. Establish and keep current the course of instruction for
Government quality assurance and contractor quality
control personnel, and insure that initial and follow-on
training is properly conducted.
D. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
The following are recommended topics for further research:
1. Research how installations have implemented OFPP Policy
Letter 91-2, and the impact it has had on food service
contracting.
2. Conduct a Benefit and Cost Analysis of the use of a
fixed-price award fee contract for food service.
3
.
Research the measures to develop an appropriate contin-
gency plan for terminated food service contracts.
4. Research the recommendation of using a central contract




LIST OF ARMED SERVICE BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
(ASBCA) CASES REVIEWED
1. Appeal of — Diversified Contract Services, Inc., ASBCA
No. 40509, 91-1 B.C. A. (CCH) , P23,311, August 31, 1990.
2. Appeal of — Western States Management Services, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 39301, 90-2 B.C. A.
3. Appeal of — Eagle Management, Inc., ASBCA No. 35902, 90-
1 B.C. A. (CCH) P22,513, November 30, 1989.
4. Appeal of — Hart's Food Service, Inc., ASBCA No. 30756,
89-2 B.C. A. (CCH) P21,789, April 10, 1989.
5. Appeal of — Delta Food Service, ASBCA No. 30757, 89-2
B.C. A. (CCH) P21,789, April 10, 1989.
6. Appeal of — Arrow Janitorial Service, ASBCA No. 35209,
89-2 B.C. A. (CCH) P21,860, March 1989.
7. Appeal of — Holmes and Narver Services, Inc., ASBCA No.
33025, 88-3 B.C. A. (CCH) P20,932, June 2, 1988.
8. Appeal of — J.E.T.S., Inc., ASBCA No. 28083, 88-2 B.C. A.
(CCH) P20,540, February 4, 1988.
9. Appeal of — Logistical Support, Inc., ASBCA No. 35578,
88-1 B.C. A. (CCH) P20,469, December 17, 1987.
10. Appeal of — Logistical Support, Inc., ASBCA No. 34493,
87-3 B.C. A. (CCH) P20,035, July 15, 1987.
11. Appeal of — Food Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 34067, 87-3
B.C. A. (CCH) P20,013, June 19, 1987.
12. Appeal of — JBS Missouri, Inc., ASBCA No. 34044, 87-2
B.C. A. (CCH) P19,904, June 4, 1987.
13. Appeal of — Kee Service Company, ASBCA No. 28966, 86-3
B.C. A. (CCH) P19,242, August 11, 1986.
14. Appeal of — Mark Dunning Industries, ASBCA No. 29599,
86-1 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,521, October 18, 1985.
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15. Appeal of — The Casserole of Alabama, Inc., ASBCA No.
28812, 85-3 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,364, August 14, 1985.
16. Appeal of — Moore's Cafeteria Services, Inc., ASBCA No.
28441, 85-3 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,187, June 17, 1985.
17. Appeal of — Crothall Food Services, Inc., ASBCA No.
30674, 85-3 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,308, June 10, 1985.
18. Appeal of — Leal's Food Service, Inc., ASBCA No. 28829,
85-2 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,136, May 8, 1985.
19. Appeal of — Advance Building Maintenance Company, ASBCA
Nos. 27183 and 28219, 85-2 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,076, April
23, 1985.
20. Appeal of — Lewis Management and Service Company, ASBCA
No. 24398, 85-2 B.C. A. (CCH) P18,042, April 2, 1985.
21. Appeal of — ITG Corporation, ASBCA No. 27285, 85-1
B.C. A. (CCH) P17,935, February 25, 1985.
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL DECISIONS REVIEWED
1. Matter of: KCA Corporation, B-236260.2, Comptroller
General of the United States, 69 Comp. Gen. 549, July 2,
1990.
2. Matter of: Western States Management Services, Inc., B-
235956.2, Comptroller General of the U.S., December 7,
1989.
3. Matter of: Kalara Corporation — Reconsideration, B-
230562.8, Comptroller General of the U.S., November 2,
1989.
4. Matter of: Mabuhay Building Maintenance Co., Inc. —
Reconsideration, B-23 563 0.3, Comptroller General of the
U.S., October 10, 1989.
5. Matter of: Industrial Maintenance Services, Inc.;
Logistical Support, Inc., B-235717.2, Comptroller General
of the U.S., October 6, 1989.
6. Matter of : Moore's Cafeteria Services, Inc., B-234063.4,
Comptroller General of the U.S., June 29,1989.
7. Matter of: Diversified Contract Services, Inc., B-
234660, Comptroller General of the U.S., June 29, 1989.
8. Matter of: Logistical Support, Inc., B-234621, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., May 24, 1989.
9. Matter of: Marlow Services, Inc., B-229990.3, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., April 19, 1989.
10. Matter of: Logistical Support, Inc.: Moore's Cafeteria
Services Inc., B-234894, Comptroller General of the U.S.,
April 10, 1989.
11. Matter of: MIA Creative Foods, Inc., B-233940, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., March 28, 1989.
12. Matter of: Cantu Services, Inc., B-219998.9, B-233697,
Comptroller General of the U.S., March 27, 1989.
13. Matter of: Western States Management Services, Inc., B-
231545.3, Comptroller General of the U.S., March 27, 1989.
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14. Matter of: HLJ Management Group, Inc. — Request for
Reconsideration, B-25584 3.5, Comptroller General of the
U.S. , March 6, 1989.
15. Matter of: Benco Contract Services, B-233748, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., February 24, 1989.
16. Matter of: C.N.Y. Enterprises, Inc.; B&R Food Systems,
Inc.; ABC Services, Inc., B-234063, B-234063.2, B-
234063.3, Comptroller General of the U.S., January 26,
1989.
17. Matter of: Rice Services, Ltd., B-232610, Comptroller
General of the U.S., November 23, 1988.
18. Matter of: Americorp, B-232688, Comptroller General of
the U.S., November 23, 1988.
19. Matter of: KIME Plus, Inc., B-230190.3, Comptroller
General of the U.S., November 1, 1988.
20. Matter of: Defense Services, Inc., B-232303.3,
Comptroller General of the U.S., November 1, 1988.
21. Matter of: L&E Service Company, B-2 31841.2, Comptroller
General of the U.S., October 27, 1988.
22. Matter of: HLJ Management Group, Inc., B-225843.3,
Comptroller General of the U.S., October 20, 1988.
23. Matter of: Americorp, B-231769, Comptroller General of
the U.S., September 13, 1988.
24. Matter of: LD Research Corporation, B-230912.3, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., September 9, 1988.
25. Matter of: JL Associates, Inc., B-225843.4, Comptroller
General of the U.S., July 22, 1988.
26. Matter of: Colbar, Inc., File: B-230754, Comptroller
General of the U.S., June 13, 1988.
27. Matter of : Alaska Lee/Global Services, Inc., B-230912.2,
Comptroller General of the U.S., May 27, 1988.
28. Matter of: Kime-Plus, Inc., B-229990, Comptroller
General of the U.S., May 4, 1988.
29. Matter of: Integrity Management International, Inc., B-
230795.2, Comptroller General of the U.S., April 25,
1988.
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30. Matter of: Ramirez Enterprises, B-229636.3, Comptroller
General of the U.S., March 28, 1988.
31. Matter of : Colbar, Inc., B-227555.4, Comptroller General
of the U.S., February 19, 1988.
32. Matter of: Uniserv, Inc.; Fort Riley Food Service Co.,
a Joint Venture, B-228530; B-228530.2, Comptroller
General of the U.S., December 23, 1987.
33. Matter of: Diversified Contract Services, Inc., B-
227555.3, Comptroller General of the United States,
November 25, 1987.
34. Matter of: Diversified Contract Services, Inc., B-
224152.2, Comptroller General of the U.S., July 27, 1987.
35. Matter of: Appletown food Service and Management Corpor-
ation, B-225125.2, Comptroller General of the U.S., May
27, 1987.
36. Matter of: Kime-Plus, Inc., B-223945.2, Comptroller
General of the U.S., May 14, 1987.
37. Matter of: Integrity Management International, Inc., B-
222405.4, Comptroller General of the U.S., February 26,
1987.
38. Matter of: Military Base Management, Inc., B-224115,
Comptroller General of the U.S., December 30, 1986.
39. Matter of: Variable Staffing Systems, B-224105, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., December 23, 1986.
40. Matter of: Diversified Contract Services, Inc., B-
224152, Comptroller General of the U.S., December 15,
1986.
41. Matter of : Robertson & Penn, Inc., B-223945, Comptroller
General of the U.S., October 30 1986.
42. Matter of: T.A.M. , Inc., B-224193, Comptroller General
of the U.S., September 26, 1986.
43. Matter of: Food Services, Inc., B-222578, Comptroller
General of the U.S., July 24, 1986.
44. Matter of: Exquisito Services, Inc., B-222200.3, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., July 17, 1986.
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45. Matter of: United Food Services—Reconsideration, B-
218165.2; B-218165.3, Comptroller General of the U.S.,
June 10, 1986.
46. Matter of: Military Services, Inc. of Georgia, B-221384,
Comptroller General of the U.S., April 30, 1986.
47. Matter of: United Food Services, Inc., B-220367, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., February 20, 1986.
48. Matter of: Colbar, Inc.—Reconsideration, B-218228.4,
Comptroller General of the U.S., February 13, 1986.
49. Matter of: Benco Contract Services Co., B-218465.2,
Comptroller General of the United States, January 15,
1986.
50. Matter of: United Food Services, Inc., B-218228.3, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., December 30, 1985.
51. Matter of: United Food Services, Inc., B-217211, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., September, 24, 1985.
52. Matter of: Appletown Food Service and Management Corp-
oration—Reconsideration, B-218201.5, Comptroller General
of the U.S., July 1, 1985.
53. Matter of: J.E.D. Service Co., B-218228, Comptroller
General of the U.S., May 30, 1985.
54. Matter of : DAVSAM International, Inc., B-218201.3, Comp-
troller General of the U.S., April 22, 1985.
55. Matter of: Rice Services, B-218001.2, Comptroller





1. Report to the Secretary of Defense (PLRD-82-3)
,
Department of Defense Food Service Program Needs
Contracting and Management Improvements . 2 October
1981.
B. ARMY AUDIT AGENCY
1. Contracting For Food Services . SO91-203, U.S. Army
Infantry Center and Fort Benning, Fort Benning,
Georgia, March 1991.
2. Food Service Operations . SW-90-25, U.S. Army South,
September 1990.
3. Contracting For Food Services . SW-90-215, III Corps
and Fort Hood, Fort Hood, Texas, August 1990.
4. Food Service Operations . WE 89-11, I Corps and Fort
Lewis, Fort Lewis, Washington, July 1989.
5. Food Service Operations . SW-89-7, 4th Infantry
Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, January 1989.
6. Food Service Operations . MW 88-12, U.S. Army Armor
Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, Kentucky, September
1988.
7. Food Service Operations . NC 88-11, U.S. Army Quarter-
master Center and Fort Lee, Fort Lee, Virginia,
September 1988.
8. Food Service Operations . SW 87-15, U.S. Army Field
Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
June 1987.
9. Food Service Operations . SW 87-9, Fort Sam Houston,
Texas, April 1987.
10. Food Service Operations . SW 87-8, Academy of Health
Sciences, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, March 1987.
113
11. Food Service Contracting . HQ 87-704, 7th Infantry
Division (Light) and Fort Ord, Fort Ord, California,
March 1987.
12. Food Service Operations . U.S. Army Missile Command,
Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, June 1985.
13. Food Service Operations . SO 85-14, U.S. Army Chemical
and Military Police Centers and Fort McClellan, Fort
McClellan, Alabama, June 1985.
C. NAVAL AUDIT SERVICE




Review of Supply Management. Financial Management, and
Real Property . A40284L, May 1984.
3. Covering Functional Area Food . C44460, Pensacola,
Florida, September 1980.
4 Commander Medium Attack Tactical Electronic Warfare
Wing Audit . A10589/A10479 , San Diego, California,
April 1980.
5. Naval Technical Training Center. Corrv Station Audit .
A41140, Pensacola, Florida, April 1980.
6. Naval Station Charleston Audit . A 41479, Charleston,
South Carolina, March 1980.
114
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. National Contract Management Journal, CM Interview with
Dr. Allan V. Burman. Administrator. Office of Federal
Procurement Policy , by Bill Welsh, March 1991.
2. Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 91-2,
Service Contracting . April 1991.
3. Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1991 Edition, Department
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C.
4. The Service Contract Act of 1965, 79 Stat. (1965), USC
357.
5. "Contract Services: OFPP Current Labor Department Regs,
Proposes Revised Policies for Government Agencies Under
SCA," Federal Contracts Report, 31 January 1977.
6. "Contract Services: OMB Proposes Sharp Rise in Cost
Factors on Retirement Insurance for Cost Comparison,"
Federal Contracts Reports, 30 August 1977.
7. "Contract Services: OFPP Solicits Congress' Support in
Managing A-76 Policy without Undue Restrictions," Federal
Contracts Report, 17 April 1978.
8. Office of Federal Procurement Policy Pamphlets No. 4.,
Writing and Administering Performance of Work Statements .
October 1980.
9. Comptroller General of the United States Decision 207771,
dated 28 February 1983.
10. Ault, D.K., "Smarter Contracting of Installation Support
Services," Contract Management . November 1986.
11. General Accounting Office Report to the Secretary of
Defense (GAO/NSAID 87-7) Opportunity to Use More
Preferred Practices for Base Support Contracts . February
1987.
12. Kittner, P.M. and Lawrence L. Martin Purchase of Service
Contracting . Newbury Park, California: SAGE Publica-
tions, 1987.
115
13. Cibinic, Jr., J. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr. Administration of
Government Contracts . 2d ed. , 2d printing, 1986.
14. Appeal of Eagle Management, Inc., ASBCA No. 39360, Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 1989 ASBCA, 90-1
B.C. A. (CCH) , November 30, 1989.
15. Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Memorandum, Reducing
the Cost of Competition In Navy Acquisition, 15 September
1988.
16. Integrity Management International, Inc., B-222405.4,
Comptroller General of the United States, 1987 U.S. Comp.
Gen. Proc. Dec. P. 220, February 26, 1987.
17. U.S. General Accounting Office Report to the Secretary of
Defense (PLRD-82-3) , Department of Defense Food Service
Program Needs Contracting and Management Improvements . 20
October 1981.
18. Department of the Army, East Central Region U.S. Army
Audit Agency, Food Service Operations . U.S. Army Quarter-
master Center and Fort Lee, NC88-11, Fort Lee, Virginia,
30 September 1988.
19. Department of the Navy, Naval Audit Service Southeast
Region, Audit Report A4114 0, Naval Technical Training
Center, Corry Station, Pensacola, Florida, 19 April 1980.
116
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145





Commandant of the Marine Corps
Code TE06
Headquarters, U.S. Marines Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-0001
















8. Captain Matthew Ochs
Box 61
Tylersburg, Pennsylvania 16361
117



DUDLEY h
GAYLORD S

